



Technical Memorandum

To:Alex Smith, Enbridge EnergyFrom:Ryan Erickson and Chris GoscinakSubject:Superior Terminal Manifold 225 ReleaseDate:February 15, 2015WDNR SERTS ID:20141203NO16-1Barr Project:49161301

This memorandum summarizes the field screening, analytical sampling, and waste management assistance conducted by Barr Engineering (Barr) at the request of Enbridge Energy (Enbridge) in response to the Manifold 225 crude oil release at the Enbridge Superior Terminal in Superior, Wisconsin in December of 2014 (Figure 1).

Background and Response Activities

On December 3, 2014 at approximately 8:45 AM, approximately 5.95 barrels of crude oil were released from a vertical 2-inch pipe on Manifold 225 (Figure 2; Photos 1, 2, 3) during pipeline maintenance activities. The crude oil was released onto the ground surface beneath the release point and some product mist sprayed into the air and blew to the east of the release point (Photo 4). The Enbridge Pipe Line Maintenance (PLM) personnel conducting the maintenance immediately responded to the release by replacing the 2-inch pipeline plug to halt the release and initiated remediation activities. Remediation activities included: recovering product with a vacuum truck where possible; removing crude oil from the manifold infrastructure with a biodegradable degreaser; and excavating soil containing crude oil from the release area with hydrovacuum (hydrovac) trucks, excavators, and hand tools. Shortly after the release, PLM personnel notified Enbridge Environment and the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR). The WDNR assigned Substance Release Notification Report (SERTS) number 20141203NO16-1 to the release (Attachment A).

Enbridge Environment requested that Barr assist with the following activities:

- assess and document the environmental conditions present during the response actions and after completion of remedial activities,
- assist with the coordination of off-site disposal of contaminated soil,
- prepare a memorandum summarizing the release response activities and the site environmental conditions upon completion of the cleanup activities.

Field Activities

On December 3 and 4, 2014, Barr was onsite to field screen soil, collect analytical samples, and assist with the contaminated soil management.

Soil samples were collected from the excavation extents and field screened by Barr for the presence of organic vapors using a photoionization detector (PID). Samples were also physically inspected for the presence of other potential indicators of crude oil impacts such as obvious odor, discoloration and sheen. PID readings and physical observations were documented on screening logs (Attachment B).

Soil was classified as contaminated if PID headspace readings were greater than 10 parts per million (ppm), or other physical observations of oil impacts were observed, as outlined in the pending WDNR Enbridge Superior Terminal *Site Investigation and Response Action Plan* (SI/RAP) (2014). If contaminated soil remains in place following remediation activities, soil samples are to be submitted to a laboratory for analyses of petroleum volatile organic compounds (PVOC) and naphthalene to document contaminant concentrations.

Barr collected three analytical samples (*Manifold 225-S-1, Manifold 225-S-2, Manifold 225-B-1*) from the excavation and submitted them to Legend Technical Services in St. Paul, Minnesota for analysis. Analyte concentrations were then compared to WDNR industrial direct contact residual concentration limits (RCL's), WDNR groundwater RCL's and Cumulative Hazard Index criteria.

Excavated soil with field screening evidence of contamination was transported to the Terminal Soil Management Area (SMA) contaminated-soil staging area where it was stockpiled until off-site disposal could be arranged. Samples of the stockpiled soil were collected and submitted to Legend for characterization.

Results

Barr was onsite during the Manifold 225 release remedial actions on December 3 and December 4, 2014. Barr's analytical sampling locations are shown on Figure 3 and field screening data is provided in Attachment B. Laboratory results are summarized in Table 1 and laboratory reports are provided in Attachment C.

Barr observed that the area impacted by the crude oil release was approximately 65 feet long (east to west) by 25 feet wide (north to south). Soil at the ground surface was primarily sand fill that had been used as backfill around the recently constructed manifold structure. The ground surface was frozen to a depth of approximately 0.5 feet below ground surface (bgs); which prevented significant infiltration of the crude oil into the soil in most areas. The largest volume of product released onto the ground surface was focused in an area within 10 feet of the release point. Crude oil contaminated soil to the east of the release point, up to 60 feet away, was caused by the wind blowing the released crude oil mist.

Release Point Remedial Excavations

Remedial excavation activity near the release point was conducted on December 3 and December 4, 2014 (Photos 2, 5, 6, 7). Product pooled in this area before it could be removed and the crude oil was able to infiltrate beneath the frost layer along preferential pathways (e.g. pipeline infrastructure, wooden lathe). A surficial scrape of soil was conducted throughout the area to remove soil with crude oil impacts. Small pockets of crude oil were identified in two limited areas where soil impacts were observed at depths up to 7.5 feet bgs. Two remedial excavations were made in these areas, a 7-foot by 7-foot by 7.5-foot deep excavation (Photo 6) and a 5-foot by 5-foot by 4-foot deep excavation (Photo 7), to remove contaminated soil (Figure 3). Most crude oil contaminated soil in the release area was removed during the excavation activities; however, small areas of residual contamination could not be excavated due to the presence of buried pipeline infrastructure.

Barr collected 7 field screening samples from the final sidewalls and bottom of the two release point remedial excavations after completion of cleanup activities. PID headspace readings from excavation sidewall samples from 0 and 4 feet bgs were between 3.1 and 19.0 ppm. Soil from the final release point excavation bottom, at 7.5 feet bgs, had a PID headspace reading of 68.3 ppm (Attachment B).

Barr collected analytical soil sample *Manifold 225-S-1* (2 feet bgs) from the smaller excavation to the north of the release point and samples *Manifold 225-S-2* (4 feet bgs) and *Manifold 225-B-1* (7.5 feet bgs) from the larger southern release point excavation. Analyte concentrations in *Manifold 225-B-1* and *Manifold 225-S-1* were below WDNR Industrial Contact RCL's, above WDNR Groundwater RCL's and passed the Cumulative Hazard Index criteria (Table 1). Analyte concentrations in *Manifold 225-S-2* were below WDNR Industrial Contact RCL's and passed the Cumulative Hazard Index criteria (Table 1). Analyte RCL's and passed the Cumulative Hazard Index criteria.

Release Area Surficial Scrape

The eastern 2/3 of the broader release area was impacted by the wind-blown crude oil spray and the impacts were limited to the surficial soil. In this area, a shallow surficial scrape using excavators, hydrovac trucks and hand tools was conducted to remove the contaminated soil (Photo 9). Barr collected 23 field screening soil samples from the spray area and PID headspace readings were all less than 10 ppm with the exception of screening point *B-10* at 0.25 feet bgs which had a headspace of 11.7 ppm (Attachment B). Soil from the *B-10* screening point had no visible crude oil staining and had a citrus odor that was similar to the odor of the degreaser that was used to clean the pipeline infrastructure. The 11.7 ppm headspace detection was attributed to the degreaser. No analytical samples were collected from the spray area after a discussion with the WDNR.

The release-point excavations and the surficial scrape areas were backfilled with clean fill upon completion of the remedial activities.

Discussion

No residual free-product was identified at the release site after completion of cleanup activities. PVOC and naphthalene concentrations in samples collected from the final excavation extents were below WDNR Industrial Direct Contact RCL's and passed the Cumulative Hazard Index criteria. Analyte concentrations in samples *Manifold 225-B-1* and *Manifold 225-S-1* did exceed WDNR Groundwater Criteria; however, groundwater monitoring at the Superior Terminal will be conducted on a facility-wide basis as part of the hydrogeologic performance standard established in the WDNR *SI/RAP* and project specific monitoring is not required for this site. No potential vapor receptors were identified as defined in the *WDNR Enbridge Superior Terminal SI/RAP* (2014).

Waste Disposal Coordination and Documentation

Barr collected four analytical waste characterization samples (*Manifold 225-STOCKPILE-1, Manifold 225-STOCKPILE-2, Manifold 225-STOCKPILE-3, Manifold 225-STOCKPILE-4*) from the crude oil impacted soil stockpile (Photo 10) for laboratory analysis at Legend Technical Services. Samples *Manifold 225-STOCKPILE-1* and *Manifold 225-STOCKPILE-2* were analyzed for diesel range organics (DRO) and benzene, toluene, ethyl benzene, and xylenes (BTEX) and samples *Manifold 225-STOCKPILE-3* and *Manifold 225-STOCKPILE-4* were analyzed for TCLP benzene. A waste profile application was submitted to the Shamrock Landfill located in Cloquet, Minnesota and the soil was accepted under waste profile #CL15-0001. A total of 51.57 tons of crude oil impacted soil was hauled to the landfill in January of 2015. Barr also prepared a soil management technical memo (1/26/2015) for Enbridge that described the statistical methodology used to evaluate the stockpile's average TCLP benzene value. The waste profile documents, the waste characterization laboratory report, the landfill summary report, and the Barr soil management technical memo are included in Attachment D.

Conclusions

Crude oil contaminated soil excavated from the Manifold 225 release site was managed of at an approved landfill. Contaminated soil that could not be excavated due to the presence of terminal infrastructure had PVOC and naphthalene concentrations less than WDNR Industrial Direct Contact RCLs and passed the WDNR Cumulative Hazard Index criteria. The presence of clean fill and employee-awareness will prevent direct contact exposure. Analyte concentrations did exceed WDNR Groundwater Criteria; however, groundwater monitoring at the Superior Terminal will be conducted on a facility-wide basis as part of the hydrogeologic performance standard established in the WDNR *SI/RAP* and project specific monitoring is not required for this site.

Barr believes that no further response action will be required by the WDNR at this site and that the release site will be added to the WDNR GIS Registry Enbridge Superior Terminal Super ERP Site.

Attachments

Photos		otos 1 through 10			
Figure 1	Site Lo	Site Location Map			
Figure 2	Site La	yout Map			
Figure 3	Sample Location Map				
Table 1	Soil An	alytical Data Summary			
Attachme	nt A	Release Reporting Documents			
Attachment B		Site Investigation Field Sampling and Screening Log			
Attachme	nt C	Legend Technical Services Laboratory Report			

Attachment D Waste Disposal Documentation

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Site Photos



Photo 1: Manifold 225 release area with remedial response personnel and equipment. Photo taken facing north on December 3, 2014.



Photo 2

Photo 2: Release location. The 2-inch pipe is located above the section of brown pipeline shown in the center of the photo and in Photo 3. Photo taken facing north on December 3, 2014.Photo 3: The 2-inch pipe release source. The 2-inch pipe is the short vertical pipe above the section of brown pipeline. Photo taken facing north on December 3, 2014.

Photo 3



Photo 4

Photo 5

Photo 4: Crude oil contaminated soil and timber mat south of the release point. Photo taken facing east on December 3, 2014.

Photo 5: Remedial scrape/excavation activity using an excavator (left) and a hydrovac truck (silver tube on right). Photo taken facing northeast on December 3, 2014.



Photo 6

Photo 7

Photo 6: Remedial excavation located beneath the release point. Photo taken on December 4, 2014.

Photo 7: The smaller northern remedial excavation in the release area is shown in the center of the photo. Photo taken facing east on December 4, 2014.



Photo 8

Photo 9


Photo 8: Crude oil contaminated soil encountered in northern remedial excavation. This contaminated soil is representative of the contaminated soil pockets encountered in the immediate release area excavations. Photo taken on December 4, 2014.
Photo 9: Final spray zone remedial scrape excavation. Photo taken facing west on December 4, 2014.





Photo 10: Manifold 225 crude oil release contaminated soil stockpile in the Superior Terminal SMA building on December 19, 2014.

Table 1 Soil Analytical Data Summary Enbridge Manifold 225 Units, mg/kg (unless otherwise noted)

			Solids,	1,2,4-	1,3,5-							WDNR RCL Dete	rminations ¹	
		Parameter	percent			Benzene	Ethyl benzene	Naphthalene	Toluene	Xylene, total	Exceedance Count	Hazard Index	Cumulative Cancer Risk	Pass or Fail
		Exceedance												
	Effective Date	Key												
Wisconsin Groundwater RCLs	06/01/2014	Bold		1.3793 TR	1.3793 TR	0.0051	0.785	0.3294	0.5536	1.97 XYL				
Wisconsin Industrial DC RCLs	06/01/2014	No Exceed		219	182	7.41	37	26	818	258	0	1.0	0.00001	Pass
Location	Date	Depth (ft)												
Manifold 225-B-1	12/04/2014	7.5	78 %	0.0069 j	< 0.0079	0.034	0.020 jb	< 0.028	0.0081 j	< 0.018	0	0.0001	6.2E-09	Pass
Manifold 225-S-1	12/04/2014	3	90 %	0.0070 j	< 0.0086	0.011 j	0.024 jb	< 0.031	0.012 j	0.034 j	0	0.0001	3.3E-09	Pass
Manifold 225-S-2	12/04/2014	4	97 %	< 0.0031	< 0.0071	< 0.0033	0.017 jb	< 0.025	< 0.0047	< 0.016	0	0	1.9E-09	Pass







Attachment A

Release Reporting Documents

Ryan E. Erickson

From:	Alex Smith <alex.smith@enbridge.com></alex.smith@enbridge.com>
Sent:	Friday, December 05, 2014 10:43 AM
То:	Ryan E. Erickson
Subject:	FW: WI SPILL #8799 SERTS ID 20141203NO16-1 - CRUDE OIL

Ryan, the spill number from the WDNR is listed below.

Thanks, Alex

-----Original Message-----From: Theresa Picton Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2014 12:48 PM To: Alex Smith Subject: FW: WI SPILL #8799 SERTS ID 20141203NO16-1 - CRUDE OIL

Confirmation of call to the state of WI.

-----Original Message-----From: lukas.wiersema@wisconsin.gov [mailto:lukas.wiersema@wisconsin.gov] Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2014 12:47 PM To: Theresa Picton Subject: WI SPILL #8799 SERTS ID 20141203NO16-1 - CRUDE OIL

Substance Release Notification from Wisconsin DNR Spill Electronic Reporting and Tracking System (SERTS):

SERTS Spill ID: 20141203NO16-1

Date/Time Reported: 12/03/2014 12:31

Person Reporting (PR): TERRI PICTON COMPLIANCE COORDINATOR ENBRIDGE PIPELINES theresa.picton@enbridge.com (715) 398-4779 Person Reporting is RP Contact

Date/Time Occurred: 12/03/2014 08:45

Location: NO REGION DOUGLAS COUNTY CITY OF SUPERIOR ENBRIDGE SUPERIOR TERMINAL 2800 E 21ST ST

Responsible Party (RP): ENBRIDGE PIPELINES

Substance: CRUDE OIL (Petroleum) Released Amt: 60 Gal Recovered Amt: UNKNOWN

Spill Cause: PLUGGING TOR'S TO REMOVE VALVE'S PLUG IN THE TOR WAS NOT CEDED/ TOR PLUG RELEASED AND LET OIL OUT.

NO EVACUATION

NO INJURIES

Weather: COLD WINDY

Contractor Hired: BARR ENGINEERING

Cleanup Method: CLEAN UP IS BEING DONE BUT CALLER IS UNSURE OF WHAT IS BEING DONE.

Additional Comments: NONE ENTERED

Notified JOHN SAGER at 12:38 by Voicemail

Form Completed by: LUKAS WIERSEMA (608) 267-0844 lukas.wiersema@wisconsin.gov

Notification sent to: andrew.savagian@wisconsin.gov anita.smith@wi.gov danielle.wincentsen@wisconsin.gov dmawemdutyofficer@wisconsin.gov dnrledo@wisconsin.gov dnrlehotline@wisconsin.gov frank.docimo@wisconsin.gov halbur.kathy@epa.gov jason.lowery@wisconsin.gov john.sager@wisconsin.gov kkesler@douglascountywi.org laura.kwilinski@dot.gov philip.richard@wisconsin.gov randy.books@wi.gov robert.clatterbuck@dot.gov stephanie.krueger@dhs.wisconsin.gov theresa.picton@enbridge.com

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NOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a exceed \$100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except t penalty shall not exceed \$1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.		OMB NO: 2137-0047 EXPIRATION DATE: 01/3	31/2014	
A	Original Report Date:	12/23/20	14	
U.S Department of Transportation	No.	20140438 - 2	20016	
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration		(DOT Use Only)		
A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respon with a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction	TEMS	pe subject to a penalty for fai		
OMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 21 to be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the completing and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collectio burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including sugge Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, N	37-0047. Public reportin e time for reviewing instr on of information are man stions for reducing this be	g for this collection of informatic terms of the data nuctions, gathering the data nuctions. Send comments reg	ation is estimate eeded, and arding this	
INSTRUCTIONS				
Important: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before yo examples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline.	PHMSA Pipeline Safety	Community Web Page at		
Report Type: (select all that apply)	Original: Yes	Supplemental:	Final: Yes	
Last Revision Date:	163		163	
1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID):	11169			
2. Name of Operator		GY, LIMITED PARTNERS	HIP	
3. Address of Operator:				
3a. Street Address	1100 LOUISIANA, S	SUITE 3300		
3b. City	HOUSTON			
3c. State	Texas			
3d. Zip Code	77002			
4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident:	12/03/2014 08:45			
5. Location of Accident:	•			
Latitude:	46.69354			
Longitude:	-92.049			
6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable):				
7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the				
National Response Center (if applicable):				
 Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant volume released) 	Crude Oil			
- Specify Commodity Subtype:				
- If "Other" Subtype, Describe:				
 If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is Ethanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend: 				
%:				
 If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is Biodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B100): 				
B 9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels):	5.95			
 Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Darrels). 10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown (Barrels): 	0.80			
11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels):	5.95			
12. Were there fatalities?	No			
- If Yes, specify the number in each category:	-			
12a. Operator employees				
12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator				
12c. Non-Operator emergency responders				
12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT associated with this Operator				
12e. General public				
12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)				
	No			
13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization?	110			
- If Yes, specify the number in each category: 13a. Operator employees				
If Yes, specify the number in each category:				

13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT	
associated with this Operator	
13e. General public	
13f. Total injuries (sum of above)	
14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident?	No
- If No, Explain:	Line was already shut down for routine maintenance
- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)	1
14a. Local time and date of shutdown:	
14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted:	
 Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required) 	
15. Did the commodity ignite?	No
16. Did the commodity explode?	No
17. Number of general public evacuated:	0
18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):	
18a. Local time Operator identified Accident:	12/03/2014 08:45
18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site:	12/03/2014 08:45
PART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION	
1. Was the origin of Accident onshore?	Yes
If Yes, Complete Quest	tions (2-12)
If No, Complete Question	ons (13-15)
- If Onshore:	
2. State:	Wisconsin
3. Zip Code:	
4. City	Superior
5. County or Parish	Douglas
6. Operator-designated location:	
Specify:	
7. Pipeline/Facility name:	PE/Superior Terminal
8. Segment name/ID:	Manifold 225 Piping
9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)?	No
10. Location of Accident:	Totally contained on Operator-controlled property
11. Area of Accident (as found):	Aboveground
Specify:	Typical aboveground facility piping or appurtenance
- If Other, Describe:	
Depth-of-Cover (in):	
12. Did Accident occur in a crossing?	No
- If Yes, specify below:	
- If Bridge crossing –	
Cased/ Uncased:	
- If Railroad crossing –	
Cased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled	
- If Road crossing –	
Cased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled	
- If Water crossing –	
Cased/ Uncased	
- Name of body of water, if commonly known:	
- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:	
- Approx. water deptri (it) at the point of the Accident. - Select:	
- Jeleci.	
13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:	
14. Origin of Accident:	
- In State waters - Specify:	
- In State waters - Specify. - State:	
- Area:	
- Alea. - Block/Tract #:	
- Block Haci #. - Nearest County/Parish:	
- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:	
- Area:	
- Alea. - Block #:	
15. Area of Accident:	
PART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION	
1. Is the pipeline or facility:	Interstate
 Is the pipeline or facility: Part of system involved in Accident: 	Interstate Onshore Terminal/Tank Farm Equipment and Piping
 Is the pipeline or facility: Part of system involved in Accident: If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached 	
 Is the pipeline or facility: Part of system involved in Accident: 	

- If Pipe, specify:	
3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in):	
3b. Wall thickness (in):	
3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi):	
3d. Pipe specification:	
3e. Pipe Seam, specify:	
- If Other, Describe:	
3f. Pipe manufacturer:	
3g. Year of manufacture:	
3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify: - If Other, Describe:	
 If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify: If Other, Describe: 	
- If Valve, specify: - If Mainline, specify:	
- If Other, Describe:	
3i. Manufactured by:	
3j. Year of manufacture:	
- If Tank/Vessel, specify:	
- If Other - Describe:	
- If Other, describe:	TOR Fitting
4. Year item involved in Accident was installed:	2014
 fear item involved in Accident was installed. Material involved in Accident: 	Carbon Steel
- If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify:	
6. Type of Accident Involved:	Leak
	Leak
- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:	
in. (axial) by in. (circumferential)	
- If Leak - Select Type:	Connection Failure
- If Other, Describe:	
- If Rupture - Select Orientation:	
If Other Describes	
- If Other, Describe:	
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by	
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially)	
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by	
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially)	
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION	N
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact:	
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:	N
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATIO 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic	N
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds	N
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATIO 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic	N
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds	N
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination:	No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned:	No Yes
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation:	No Yes No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned:	No Yes No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:	No Yes No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water	No Yes No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater	No Yes No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil	No Yes No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination:	No Yes No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination: 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:	No Yes No No No No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination:	No Yes No No No No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination: 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:	No Yes No No No No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination: 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Ocean/Seawater - Surface	No Yes No No No No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination: 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Ocean/Seawater - Surface - Groundwater	No Yes No No No No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination: 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Ocean/Seawater - Surface - Groundwater - Drinking water: (Select one or both)	No Yes No No No No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination: 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Ocean/Seawater - Surface - Groundwater - Surface - Groundwater - Surface - Groundwater - Drinking water: (Select one or both) - Private Well	No Yes No No No No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination: 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Ocean/Seawater - Surface - Groundwater - Surface - Private Well - Drinking water: (Select one or both) - Private Well	No Yes No No No No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination: 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Ocean/Seawater - Surface - Groundwater - Surface - Private Well - Drinking water: (Select one or both) - Private Well - Public Water Intake 5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels):	No Yes No No No No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination: 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Ocean/Seawater - Surface - Groundwater - Surface - Private Well - Drinking water: (Select one or both) - Private Well - Public Water Intake 5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels): 5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known:	No Yes No No No No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination: 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Ocean/Seawater - Surface - Groundwater - Surface - Drinking water: (Select one or both) - Private Well - Drinking water: (Select one or both) - Public Water Intake 5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels): 5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known: 6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility	No No Yes No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination: 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Ocean/Seawater - Surface - Groundwater - Surface - Drinking water: (Select one or both) - Private Well - Drinking water: (Select one or both) - Public Water Intake 5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels): 5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known: 6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility been identified as one that "could affect" a High Consequence Area	No Yes No No No No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination: 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Occan/Seawater - Surface - Groundwater - Surface - Drinking water: (Select one or both) - Private Well - Drinking water in commonly known: 6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility been identified as one that "could affect" a High Consequence Area (HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?	No No Yes No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination: 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Ocean/Seawater - Surface - Groundwater - Surface - Urinking water: (Select one or both) - Private Well - Public Water Intake 5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels): 5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known: 6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility been identified as one that "could affect" a High Consequence Area (HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program? 7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in	No No Yes No
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination: 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Ocean/Seawater - Surface - Groundwater - Surface - Groundwater - Surface - Ocean/Seawater - Surface - Brinking water: (Select one or both) - Private Well - Private Well - Private Well - Public Water Intake 5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels): 5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known: 6. At the location of this Accident, had	No No Yes No No No No No No No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination: 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Ocean/Seawater - Surface - Groundwater - Surface - Urinking water: (Select one or both) - Private Well - Public Water Intake 5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels): 5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known: 6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility been identified as one that "could affect" a High Consequence Area (HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program? 7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in	No No Yes No No No No No No No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

determination for this Assident site in the Operator's	
determination for this Accident site in the Operator's	
Integrity Management Program?	
- High Population Area:	Yes
Was this HCA identified in the "could affect"	Vee
determination for this Accident site in the Operator's	Yes
Integrity Management Program?	Yes
- Other Populated Area	res
Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination	Vee
for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity	Yes
Management Program?	
- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water	Yes
Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination	
for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity	Yes
Management Program?	
- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological	
Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination	
for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity	
Management Program?	
8. Estimated Property Damage:	
 8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property 	\$ 0
damage	φυ
8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost	\$ 168
8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs	\$ 19,784
8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response	\$ 15,976
8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation	\$ 5,950
8f. Estimated other costs	\$ 0
Describe:	÷
8g. Total estimated property damage (sum of above)	\$ 41.878
	ψ +1,010
PART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION	
1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig):	10.00
2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the	
Accident (psig):	275.00
3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the	
Accident (psig):	Pressure did not exceed MOP
4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations	
(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility	
relating to the Accident operating under an established pressure	No
restriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the	
MOP?	
- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:	
4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure	
restriction?	
4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the	
State?	
5. Was "Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites" OR "Offshore	No
Pipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend" selected in PART C, Question	No
2?	
- If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5e below)	1
5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release	
source:	
5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release	
source:	
source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft):	
source:	
source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft):	
source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal	(select all that apply)
source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools?	(select all that apply)
source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter	(select all that apply)
source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves	(select all that apply)
source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends	(select all that apply)
source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's,	(select all that apply)
source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting instrumentation, etc.)	(select all that apply)
source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting instrumentation, etc.) - Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic	(select all that apply)
source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting instrumentation, etc.) - Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux leakage internal inspection tools)	(select all that apply)
source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting instrumentation, etc.) - Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux leakage internal inspection tools) - Other -	(select all that apply)
source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting instrumentation, etc.) - Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux leakage internal inspection tools) - Other - - If Other, Describe:	(select all that apply)
source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting instrumentation, etc.) - Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux leakage internal inspection tools) - Other - - If Other, Describe:	(select all that apply)
source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Othanges in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting instrumentation, etc.) - Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux leakage internal inspection tools) - Other - - If Other, Describe: 5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which significantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool	(select all that apply)
source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting instrumentation, etc.) - Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux leakage internal inspection tools) - Other - - If Other, Describe: 5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which significantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool run?	
source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting instrumentation, etc.) - Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux leakage internal inspection tools) - Other - - If Other, Describe: 5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which significantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool	

- If Other, Specify: 8a. If "Controller", "Local Operating Personnel", including contractors", "Air Patrol", or "Guard Patrol by Operator or its contractor" is selected in Question 8, specify the following: Operator employed 9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or control room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the Accident? No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) Iack of Control Ce - If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply) Lack of Control Ce - Investigation and other factors associated with fatigue Investigation identified no control room issues - Investigation identified no control room issues Investigation identified no control room issues - Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations, continuous hours of service (while working for the Operator), and other factors associated with fatigue - Investigation identified no control room issues Investigation identified no control room issues - Investigation identified no control room issues Investigation identified no control reaction or controller (s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s) response - Investigation identified incorrect procedures Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment operation - Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected control oroom operations, procedures, and/or controller </th <th></th>	
Other - Other -If Other, Describe: 51. Function of pipeline system: - If Other, Describe: 520% SMYS Reg: 520% SMYS Reg: Yes (Yes) (Yes) (Yes) (Yes) (A Was it operating at the time of the Accident? (Yes) (Yes) (G. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the detection of the Accident? (G. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the detection system in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? (G. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of the Accident? (G. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the detection system information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the detection of the Accident? (G. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of the Accident? (G. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of the Accident? (I Other, Specify: (B. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? (I Other, Specify: (B. How was the Accident initially identified for no not the controller(s) or (nortroller, "Local Operating Personnel", including contractors", 'Air Patrol V Operator or not the controller(s) or controller is selected in Question 8, specify the following: (I No, the Operator) did not find that an investigation of the contr	
- If Other, Describe: > 20% SMYS Reg. 51. Function of pipeline system: > 20% SMYS Reg. 6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based system in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? Yes 6. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes 6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes 6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the detection of the Accident? No 70. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? No 71. Was a CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the detection of the Accident? No 72. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of the Accident? No 73. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of the Accident? Operator employee 9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or controller, "is selected in Question 8, specify the following: Operator employee 9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or controller(s) acidons or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an expleration for why the operstor d no invest	
51. Function of pipeline system: > 20% SMYS Reg. 6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based system in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? Yes 6. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes 6. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes 6. Was it it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes 6. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the detection of the Accident? No 7. Gd. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of the Accident? No 7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? No 7. Uwas it fully functional at the time of the Accident? No 7. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the detection of the Accident? No 7. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the detection of the Accident? Local Operating Period or its control room issue was necessary due to: (provide an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or control corn issues was necessary due to: (provide an investigation result(s): (select all that apply) No, the Operator di control ce (provide an explanation for why the operator dhor investiga	
6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based system in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? Yes If Yes - 6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes 6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes 6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the detection of the Accident? No 6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of the Accident? No 7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? No 7. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? No 7. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the detection of the Accident? No 7. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the detection of the Accident? Local Operating Per or If Other, Specify: 8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? Local Operator employee contractor*, "Air Patol", or "Guard Patrol by Operator or its contractors", salected in Question 8, specify the following: No, the Operator di control for my suges was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator dhor investigate) I. Ack of Conthrol Ce (provide an explanation for why the operator dron investi	gulated Trunkline/Transmission
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controller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s) response - Investigation identified incorrect procedures - Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment operation - Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected control room operations, procedures, and/or controller response	
response - Investigation identified incorrect procedures - Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment operation - Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected control room operations, procedures, and/or controller response	
Investigation identified incorrect procedures Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment operation Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected control room operations, procedures, and/or controller response	
Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment operation Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected control room operations, procedures, and/or controller response	
control room operations, procedures, and/or controller response	
Investigation identified areas other than those above: Describe:	

1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested	
under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's	Yes
Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?	
- If Yes:	
1a. Specify how many were tested:	2
1b. Specify how many failed:	0
2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees	
tested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of	No
DOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?	
- If Yes:	1
2a. Specify how many were tested:	
2b. Specify how many failed:	
PART G – APPARENT CAUSE	
Select only one box from PART G in shaded column on left represen the questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root	
Apparent Cause:	G7 - Incorrect Operation
G1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from share	ded left-hand column
External Corrosion:	
Internal Corrosion:	
- If External Corrosion:	
1. Results of visual examination:	
- If Other, Describe:	
2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply) - Galvanic	
- Atmospheric	
- Stray Current	
- Microbiological	
- Selective Seam	
- Other:	
- If Other, Describe:	
3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following	ng: (select all that apply)
- Field examination	
- Determined by metallurgical analysis - Other:	
- If Other, Describe:	
4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?	
- If Yes :	
□4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic	
protection at the time of the Accident?	
If Yes - Year protection started:	
4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at	
the point of the Accident?	
4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been conducted at the point of the Accident?	
If "Yes, CP Annual Survey" – Most recent year conducted:	
If "Yes, Close Interval Survey" – Most recent year conducted:	
If "Yes, Other CP Survey" – Most recent year conducted:	
- If No:	
4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?	
5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of the corrosion?	
- If Internal Corrosion:	
6. Results of visual examination:	
- Other:	
7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): -	
- Corrosive Commodity	
- Water drop-out/Acid - Microbiological	
- Microbiological - Erosion	
- Other:	
- If Other, Describe:	
8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the follow	ing (select all that apply): -
- Field examination	
- Determined by metallurgical analysis	

Other: If Other, Describe: If Other,
Low point in pipe Elbow Other: If Other, Describe: Other: If Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides? If Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating? If Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating? If Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating? If Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating? If Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating? If Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely utilized? Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Tank/Vessel. If List the year of the most recent inspections: 14. List the year of the most recent inspection completed - No Out-of-Service Inspection completed - No In-Service Inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? S. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Caliper
- Elbow - Other:
Other: If Other, Describe: If Describe: If Other, Describe: If Describe: If Other, Describe: If Describ
If Other, Describe: 10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides? 11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating? 12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely utilized? 13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized? Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Tank/Vessel. 14. List the year of the most recent inspections: 144. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection - No Out-of-Service Inspection completed - No Out-of-Service Inspection completed - No In-Service Inspection completed - No In-Service Inspection completed - No In-Service Inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? See on more internal inspect top of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Caliper
10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides? 11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating? 12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely utilized? 13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized? Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Tank/Vessel. 14. List the year of the most recent inspections: 14. List the year of the most recent inspection completed - No Out-of-Service Inspection completed 14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection completed Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Most recent year: - Ultrasonic Most recent year: - Geometry
11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating? 12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely utilized? 13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized? Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Tank/Vessel. 14. List the year of the most recent inspections: 14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection completed - No Out-of-Service Inspection completed 14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection completed Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Most recent year: - Ultrasonic Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Caliper
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13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized? Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Tank/Vessel. 14. List the year of the most recent inspections: 14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection completed 14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection completed 15b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection completed 15b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection completed 16b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection completed 17b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection completed 18b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection tool collected data at the point of the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 15b. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Caliper
Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Tank/Vessel. 14. List the year of the most recent inspections: 14. List the year of the most recent inspections: 14. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection completed 14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection completed Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Caliper
14. List the year of the most recent inspections: 14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection - No Out-of-Service Inspection completed 14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection - No In-Service Inspection completed Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Most recent year: - Ultrasonic Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Caliper
14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection - No Out-of-Service Inspection completed 14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection - No In-Service Inspection completed Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Caliper
- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed 14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection - No In-Service Inspection completed Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Most recent year: - Ultrasonic Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Caliper
14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection - No In-Service Inspection completed Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Most recent year: - Ultrasonic Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Caliper
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Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? Accident? 15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - - - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Most recent year: - Ultrasonic Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Caliper Most recent year:
Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -
Accident? 15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Most recent year: - Ultrasonic Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Caliper
15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Most recent year: - Ultrasonic Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Caliper
Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Most recent year: Ultrasonic Most recent year: Geometry Most recent year: Caliper
Most recent year: - Ultrasonic Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Caliper
Ultrasonic Most recent year: Geometry Most recent year: Caliper
Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Caliper
Most recent year: - Caliper
- Caliper
Mant unand
Most recent year:
- Crack
Most recent year:
- Hard Spot
Most recent year: - Combination Tool
Most recent year:
- Transverse Field/Triaxial
Most recent year:
- Other
Most recent year:
Describe:
16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since
original construction at the point of the Accident?
If Yes - Most recent year tested:
Test pressure:
17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment?
- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident::
Most recent year conducted:
- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:
Most recent year conducted:
18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the point of the Accident since January 1, 2002?
18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most
recent year the examination was conducted:
- Radiography
Most recent year conducted:
- Guided Wave Ultrasonic
Most recent year conducted: - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool
- Handheid Uitrasonic Tool Most recent year conducted:
- Wet Magnetic Particle Test
Most recent year conducted:
- Dry Magnetic Particle Test
Most recent year conducted:
- Other
Most recent year conducted:
Describe:

G2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from	n shaded left-handed column
Natural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:	
- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:	
1. Specify:	
- If Other, Describe: - If Heavy Rains/Floods:	
2. Specify:	
- If Other, Describe:	
- If Lightning:	
3. Specify: - If Temperature:	
4. Specify:	
- If Other, Describe:	
- If High Winds:	
- If Other Natural Force Damage:	
5. Describe:	
Complete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is sele	cted.
 Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in 	
conjunction with an extreme weather event?	
6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply)	
- Hurricane - Tropical Storm	
- Tornado	
- Other	
- If Other, Describe:	
G3 - Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from s	haded left-hand column
Excavation Damage – Sub-Cause:	
- If Excavation Damage by Operator (First Party):	
- If Excavation Damage by Operator's Contractor (Second Party):	
- If Excavation Damage by Third Party:	
- If Excavation Damage by Third Party: - If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from	PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.
If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of	PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.
If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool a	
If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool a - Magnetic Flux Leakage Most recent year conducted:	
If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool a - Magnetic Flux Leakage	
If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool a - Magnetic Flux Leakage	
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If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool a	
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If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool a Most recent year conducted: Ultrasonic Geometry Most recent year conducted: Caliper Most recent year conducted: Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack	
If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool a	
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If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool a	
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If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool a	
If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool a	
If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool a Magnetic Flux Leakage Most recent year conducted: Ultrasonic Most recent year conducted: Geometry Most recent year conducted: Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year conducted: Other Most recent year conducted:	
If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool a	
If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool a	
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If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool a	

4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline	
segment?	ident:
If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Acc Most recent year conducted:	
- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:	
Most recent year conducted:	
5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the point of the Accident since January 1, 2002?	
5a. If Yes, for each examination, conducted since January 1, 2002,	select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most
recent year the examination was conducted:	
- Radiography	
Most recent year conducted:	
- Guided Wave Ultrasonic Most recent year conducted:	
- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool	
Most recent year conducted:	
- Wet Magnetic Particle Test	
Most recent year conducted:	
- Dry Magnetic Particle Test	
Most recent year conducted:	
- Other	
Most recent year conducted: Describe:	
Complete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected	ed as the sub-cause.
6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?	
6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that apply) -	r
- One-Call System	
- Excavator	
- Contractor - Landowner	
Complete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any	y Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.
7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA-	
DIRT (www.cga-dirt.com)?	
8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) -	1
- Public	
- If "Public", Specify:	
- If "Private", Specify:	
- Pipeline Property/Easement	
- Power/Transmission Line	
- Railroad	
- Dedicated Public Utility Easement	
- Federal Land	
- Data not collected - Unknown/Other	
9. Type of excavator:	
10. Type of excavation equipment:	
11. Type of work performed:	
12. Was the One-Call Center notified?	
12a. If Yes, specify ticket number:	
12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center	
exists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified: 13. Type of Locator:	
14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation?	
15. Were facilities marked correctly?	
16. Did the damage cause an interruption in service?	
16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours)	
17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predor	
available as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root	
Root Cause:	
Root Cause: - If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify:	
Root Cause: - If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify: - If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify:	
Root Cause: - If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify: - If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify: - If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify:	
Root Cause: - If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify: - If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify:	
Root Cause: - If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify: - If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify: - If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify:	Cause as well):

- If Nearby Industrial, Man-made, or Other Fire/Explosion as Primary (Cause of Incident:
 If Damage by Car, Truck, or Other Motorized Vehicle/Equipment NO Vehicle/Equipment operated by: 	T Engaged in Excavation:
- If Damage by Boats, Barges, Drilling Rigs, or Other Maritime Equipn Their Mooring:	
2. Select one or more of the following IF an extreme weather event was a	factor:
- Hurricane - Tropical Storm	
- Tornado	
- Heavy Rains/Flood	
- Other	
- If Other, Describe:	d in Execution.
- If Routine or Normal Fishing or Other Maritime Activity NOT Engage	d in Excavation:
- If Electrical Arcing from Other Equipment or Facility:	
- If Previous Mechanical Damage NOT Related to Excavation:	
Complete Questions 3-7 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (fro	m PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.
3. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident?	
3a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and in	dicate most recent year run:
- Magnetic Flux Leakage Most recent year conducted:	
- Ultrasonic	
Most recent year conducted:	
- Geometry	
Most recent year conducted:	
- Caliper Most recent year conducted:	
- Crack	
Most recent year conducted:	
- Hard Spot	
Most recent year conducted:	
- Combination Tool	
Most recent year conducted: - Transverse Field/Triaxial	
- Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year conducted:	
- Other	
Most recent year conducted:	
Describe:	
4. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was completed BEFORE the damage was sustained?	
5. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since original construction at the point of the Accident? - If Yes:	
Most recent year tested:	
Test pressure (psig):	
6. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline segment?	
- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:	
Most recent year conducted: - If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:	
Most recent year conducted:	
7. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the point of the Accident since January 1, 2002?	
7a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, so recent year the examination was conducted:	elect type of non-destructive examination and indicate most
- Radiography Most recent year conducted:	
- Guided Wave Ultrasonic	
Most recent year conducted:	
- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool Most recent year conducted:	
Most recent year conducted: - Wet Magnetic Particle Test	
Most recent year conducted:	
- Dry Magnetic Particle Test	
Most recent year conducted:	
- Other Most recent year conducted:	
Most recent year conducted:	

Describe:	
- If Intentional Damage:	1
8. Specify:	
- If Other, Describe:	
- If Other Outside Force Damage: 9. Describe:	
9. Describe:	
G5 - Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - only one sub-cause can be	selected from the shaded left-hand column
Use this section to report material failures ONLY IF the "Item Involve "Weld."	d in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is "Pipe" or
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld – Sub-Cause:	
 The sub-cause selected below is based on the following: (select all the - Field Examination 	at apply)
- Determined by Metallurgical Analysis	
- Other Analysis	
- If "Other Analysis", Describe:	
- Sub-cause is Tentative or Suspected; Still Under Investigation	
(Supplemental Report required)	
- If Construction, Installation, or Fabrication-related:	
2. List contributing factors: (select all that apply) - Fatigue or Vibration-related	
- Fatigue or Vibration-related Specify:	
- If Other, Describe:	
- Il Other, Describe.	
- Other	
- If Other, Describe:	
- If Original Manufacturing-related (NOT girth weld or other welds for	med in the field):
2. List contributing factors: (select all that apply)	
- Fatigue or Vibration-related:	
Specify:	
- If Other, Describe:	
- Mechanical Stress:	
- Other	
- If Other, Describe:	
- If Environmental Cracking-related:	
3. Specify:	
- Other - Describe:	
Complete the following if any Material Failure of Pipe or Weld sub-cau	se is selected.
4. Additional factors: (select all that apply):	
- Dent	
- Gouge	
- Pipe Bend	
- Arc Burn	
- Crack	
- Lack of Fusion	
- Lamination	
- Buckle	
- Wrinkle	
- Misalignment	
- Burnt Steel	
- Other:	
- If Other, Describe:	
5. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident?	
5a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool a	ind indicate most recent year run:
- Magnetic Flux Leakage	
Most recent year run:	
- Ultrasonic	
Most recent year run:	
- Geometry	
- Caliper	
Most recent year run:	
- Crack	
Most recent year run:	
- Hard Spot	
Most recent year run:	

- Combination Tool	
Most recent year run:	
- Transverse Field/Triaxial	
Most recent year run:	
- Other	
Most recent year run:	
Describe:	
6. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since	
original construction at the point of the Accident?	
- If Yes:	
Most recent year tested:	
Test pressure (psig):	
7. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline	
segment?	
- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Acci	dent -
Most recent year conducted:	
- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site -	
Most recent year conducted:	
8. Has one or more non-destructive examination(s) been conducted at the	
point of the Accident since January 1, 2002?	
8a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, se	elect type of non-destructive examination and indicate most
recent year the examination was conducted: -	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
- Radiography	
Most recent year conducted:	
- Guided Wave Ultrasonic	
Most recent year conducted:	
- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool	
Most recent year conducted:	
- Wet Magnetic Particle Test	
Most recent year conducted:	
- Dry Magnetic Particle Test	
Most recent year conducted:	
- Other	
Most recent year conducted:	
Describe:	
Describe:	
Describe: G6 – Equipment Failure - only one sub-cause can be selected from t	he shaded left-hand column
G6 – Equipment Failure - only one sub-cause can be selected from t	he shaded left-hand column
	he shaded left-hand column
G6 – Equipment Failure - only one sub-cause can be selected from t	he shaded left-hand column
G6 – Equipment Failure - only one sub-cause can be selected from t Equipment Failure – Sub-Cause: - If Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment:	he shaded left-hand column
G6 – Equipment Failure - only one sub-cause can be selected from the Equipment Failure – Sub-Cause:	he shaded left-hand column
G6 – Equipment Failure - only one sub-cause can be selected from the se	he shaded left-hand column
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G6 – Equipment Failure - only one sub-cause can be selected from t Equipment Failure – Sub-Cause: - If Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment: 1. Specify: (select all that apply) - - Control Valve - Instrumentation - SCADA - Communications - Block Valve - Check Valve - Relief Valve - Stopple/Control Fitting - ESD System Failure - Other - If Other – Describe: - If Pump or Pump-related Equipment: 2. Specify: - If Other – Describe:	he shaded left-hand column
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G6 – Equipment Failure - only one sub-cause can be selected from t Equipment Failure – Sub-Cause: • If Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment: 1. Specify: (select all that apply) - - Control Valve - Instrumentation - SCADA - Communications - Block Valve - Check Valve - Relief Valve - Stopple/Control Fitting - ESD System Failure - Other - If Other – Describe: - If Pump or Pump-related Equipment: 2. Specify: - If Other – Describe:	he shaded left-hand column
G6 – Equipment Failure - only one sub-cause can be selected from t Equipment Failure – Sub-Cause: - If Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment: 1. Specify: (select all that apply) - - Control Valve - Instrumentation - SCADA - Communications - Block Valve - Check Valve - Relief Valve - Relief Valve - Stopple/Control Fitting - ESD System Failure - Other - If Other – Describe: - If Pump or Pump-related Equipment: 2. Specify: - If Other – Describe: - If Other – Describe: - If Other – Describe: - If Non-threaded Connection/Coupling Failure: 3. Specify: - If Non-threaded Connection Failure: - If Other – Describe:	he shaded left-hand column
G6 – Equipment Failure - only one sub-cause can be selected from t Equipment Failure – Sub-Cause: • If Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment: 1. Specify: (select all that apply) - - Control Valve - Instrumentation - SCADA - Communications - Block Valve - Check Valve - Relief Valve - Stopple/Control Fitting - ESD System Failure - Other - If Other – Describe: - If Pump or Pump-related Equipment: 2. Specify: - If Other – Describe:	he shaded left-hand column
G6 – Equipment Failure - only one sub-cause can be selected from t Equipment Failure – Sub-Cause: - If Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment: 1. Specify: (select all that apply) - - Control Valve - Instrumentation - SCADA - Communications - Block Valve - Check Valve - Relief Valve - Relief Valve - Stopple/Control Fitting - Stopple/Control Fitting - Stopple/Control Fitting - Other - Other - If Other – Describe: - If Pump or Pump-related Equipment: 2. Specify: - If Other – Describe: - If Non-threaded Connection/Coupling Failure: 3. Specify: - If Non-threaded Connection Failure: 4. Specify: - If Other – Describe:	
G6 – Equipment Failure - only one sub-cause can be selected from t Equipment Failure – Sub-Cause: - If Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment: 1. Specify: (select all that apply) - - Control Valve - Instrumentation - SCADA - Communications - Block Valve - Check Valve - Relief Valve - Relief Valve - Stopple/Control Fitting - ESD System Failure - Other - If Other – Describe: - If Pump or Pump-related Equipment: 2. Specify: - If Other – Describe: - If Other – Describe: - If Other – Describe: - If Non-threaded Connection/Coupling Failure: 3. Specify: - If Non-threaded Connection Failure: - If Other – Describe:	
G6 – Equipment Failure - only one sub-cause can be selected from t Equipment Failure – Sub-Cause: - If Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment: 1. Specify: (select all that apply) - - Control Valve - Instrumentation - SCADA - Communications - Block Valve - Check Valve - Relief Valve - Relief Valve - Stopple/Control Fitting - ESD System Failure - Other - Other - If Other – Describe: - If Pump or Pump-related Equipment: 2. Specify: - If Other – Describe: - If Other – Describe: - If Other – Describe: - If Non-threaded Connection/Coupling Failure: 3. Specify: - If Other – Describe: - If Non-threaded Connection Failure: 4. Specify: - If Other – Describe: - If Defective or Loose Tubing or Fitting: - If Defective or Loose Tubing or Fitting: - If Failure of Equipment Body (except Pump), Tank Plate, or other Mathematical Science of Science Pump)	
G6 – Equipment Failure - only one sub-cause can be selected from t Equipment Failure – Sub-Cause: - If Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment: 1. Specify: (select all that apply) - - Control Valve - Instrumentation - SCADA - Communications - Block Valve - Check Valve - Relief Valve - Relief Valve - Stopple/Control Fitting - ESD System Failure - Other - Other - If Pump or Pump-related Equipment: 2. Specify: - If Other – Describe: - If Threaded Connection/Coupling Failure: 3. Specify: - If Other – Describe: - If Non-threaded Connection Failure: 4. Specify: - If Other – Describe:	

Complete the following if any Equipment Failure sub-cause is selected	d.
6. Additional factors that contributed to the equipment failure: (select all t	hat apply)
- Excessive vibration	
- Overpressurization	
- No support or loss of support	
- Manufacturing defect	
- Loss of electricity	
- Improper installation	
- Mismatched items (different manufacturer for tubing and tubing	
fittings)	
- Dissimilar metals	
- Breakdown of soft goods due to compatibility issues with	
transported commodity	
- Valve vault or valve can contributed to the release	
- Alarm/status failure	
- Misalignment	
- Thermal stress	
- Other	
- If Other, Describe:	
G7 - Incorrect Operation - only one sub-cause can be selected from	the shaded left-hand column
Incorrect Operation – Sub-Cause:	
Damage by Operator or Operator's Contractor NOT Related to Excavation and NOT due to Motorized Vehicle/Equipment Damage	No
Tank, Vessel, or Sump/Separator Allowed or Caused to Overfill or Overflow	No
1. Specify:	
- If Other, Describe:	
Valve Left or Placed in Wrong Position, but NOT Resulting in a Tank, Vessel, or Sump/Separator Overflow or Facility Overpressure	No
Pipeline or Equipment Overpressured	No
Equipment Not Installed Properly	Yes
Wrong Equipment Specified or Installed	No
Other Incorrect Operation	No
2. Describe:	
Complete the following if any Incorrect Operation sub-cause is select	ed.
3. Was this Accident related to (select all that apply): -	
 Inadequate procedure No procedure established 	
- No procedure established - Failure to follow procedure	Yes
- Palidie to follow procedure - Other:	
- If Other, Describe:	
4. What category type was the activity that caused the Accident?	Routine Maintenance
5. Was the task(s) that led to the Accident identified as a covered task in your Operator Qualification Program?	Yes
5a. If Yes, were the individuals performing the task(s) qualified for the task(s)?	Yes, they were qualified for the task(s)
G8 - Other Accident Cause - only one sub-cause can be selected fr	om the shaded left-hand column
Other Accident Cause – Sub-Cause:	
- If Miscellaneous:	
1. Describe:	
- If Unknown:	

2. Specify:

PART H - NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT

On December 3 the Pipeline Maintenance (PLM) crew was working in the Superior Terminal Booster Pump 8 and 9 discharge piping near the 225 manifold. They were installing a brass plug in a 2 inch TDW Thread O-ring (TOR) fitting with a TDW T-101 plugging/tapping unit in order to remove a valve for replacement. The plug in the TOR was not properly seated and when the valve was removed, the plug released which caused approximately 250 gallons of crude oil to spill on the ground. The valve and cap were reinstalled to stop the flow of oil. An outage was scheduled for Friday December 5 to isolate the manifold pipe to allow for inspection and plug installation. In order for the plug to be properly seated the shoulder of the new brass plug needed to be sanded down. Once sanded down, the plug was fully inserted to the required completion distance, and the valve removed.

It was discovered that the depth measurements before installing the plug were not calculated (per the Enbridge Operations and Maintenance Manual). It was also determined that the threads on the TOR fitting had become deformed which prohibited the brass plug from being fully inserted and allowing full thread engagement.

Approximately 45 cubic yards of contaminated soil has been removed from the leak site. The contaminated soil is waiting proper disposal facility approval.

PART I - PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

Preparer's Name	Stacy Soine
Preparer's Title	Compliance Analyst
Preparer's Telephone Number	218-464-5754
Preparer's E-mail Address	stacy.soine@enbridge.com
Preparer's Facsimile Number	218-464-5992
Authorized Signature's Name	David Stafford
Authorized Signature Title	Manager US Pipeline Compliance
Authorized Signature Telephone Number	218-464-5751
Authorized Signature Email	david.stafford@enbridge.com
Date	12/23/2014

Attachment B

Site Investigation Field Sampling and Screening Log

5	Equipment used: <u>//</u> Sample Nomenclate Soil Sample Types: R :	ure <i>(Loci</i>	ation - sa	mple typ	e - #):		Sample ; Stoc	Background Headspace: Ø.5 ppm Date: /2/3/144 Sampler: Zitor Z Sampler: Zitor Z kpile = Stockpile Sample Calibration Time: Zitor Z (200) BAR
	Sample ID	Depth	Time (military)	Soil Type (uscs)	Color/ Discolor	Odor/ Sheen	Headspace Reading (ppm)	SITE SKETCH: north is up; excavation extents & depths, impacted areas, sample locations, borings, wells, structures, utilities, natural features 1 inch/grid = 20 FEET
	Example. TK99-S-1	4	<u>16:30</u>	<u>cı</u>	<u>Reddish brown</u>	<u>Petroleum/</u> Rainbow	275	
L	B-1	6.5	1330	ST/LL	Retrunting		5.7	
	B-Z	0.5		SP/UL			2.6	
L	B-3	0.5		SP/LL			1.8	2.0'
	3-4	0.5		SPICL			5.1	
	6-5	0.5		4			6.0	(2 exemption Retries Location (2" Ripe on top of 36")
	B-6	0.5		4			1.1	Surve estimation Retries Location (2" The on top of 36")
L	8-7	05	4	4	\downarrow		1.4	
	6-8	0	1345	Stisn	Ree beinge	51.76+	150+	Piretrus / Muni Fell
L	B-9	0		Stist	1	Susservet	Zat	All some in the second s
L	B- 10	6	V	5764		1	100 "	and show and show and show and show
L	B- 11	0.25	1410	SEKA	Lezbannine	Hore	1.4	
	B-8	0.25	1450	SIKM	Zer trumbres	None	1.0	22 17 12 4 3 2 .
L	ß - 4	0.25		SPKM			2.5	23
	B-10	025	V	SPAM	\mathbf{V}	1	11.7	· 16 15 17 8 8
L	B-12	65	1510	LLISP	Rel Diember	wase	6.0	the second secon
	B-13	0.5		LL/SP			5.4	
L	8-14	0.5		LLIST			6.1	
	B-15	0.5	V	11/8	¥	4	5.7	7
	8-16	0.5	900	(L/SP	Rezbernham	Non	5.6	Kow way
Ľ	B-17	0.5	j	(L/SP			6.1	
	B-18	0.25	V	SPKM		1	2.1	
	5 - 14	2.0	1330	SRISM	Reltom Inne	have	145,7	
	8 14	4.0	Ý	LLBP	1 1	1.	45.2	

7...

SITE INVESTIGATIO	ne Eacili	the Size	che T	45.55	Men to	2 225	Page	of
Equipment used: <u>M</u> Sample Nomenclatu	ure (Loc	ionization ation - sai	detecto mple typ	r with <u>117</u> e - #):	_eV lamp		Background Headspace: 6.5 ppm Date: 12/3/14, 12/4/44 Sampler: 656-2	RR
Soil Sample Types: R =	Remov	ed Sample	; S = Side	wall Sample ; I	B = Bottom	Sample ; Stoc	ckpile = Stockpile Sample Calibration Time: <u>1945, 900</u>	ale cair-gi
Sample ID	Depth (FT)	Time (military)	Soil Type (uscs)	Color/ Discolor	Odor/ Sheen	Headspace Reading (ppm)	SITE SKETCH: north is up; excavation extents & depths, impacted areas, sample location borings, wells, structures, utilities, natural features 1 inch/grid = FEET	s,
Example: TK99-5-1	<u>4</u>	<u>16:30</u>	<u>a</u>	<u>Reddish brown</u>	<u>Petroleum/</u> Rainbow	<u>275</u>		
B - Zo	7.5	1350	LL	Redbronders	start /mine	68.3		-
5-21	4	1400	SP/SM	Responde	us how	14.0		
5-21	Ż		LL/SP			3.1		
B-22	0,5					2.1		- 11
B-23	0.5		\checkmark	¥	T T	1.4		
5-24	2	1415	G. ISP	Rel Darm from	home	12.6		
5-24	4	145	\rightarrow	2	\downarrow	18.2		
Analytical Samples:								
Auntal 1 225-5-1	(2) 5	-19 2	693					
Aun: for225-5-2	(a) S	-21,4	1 345					
Non-fol225-B-1	a f	-20 -	S'bo					
		, ,						

Attachment C

Legend Technical Services Laboratory Report



88 Empire Drive St Paul, MN 55103 Tel: 651-642-1150 Fax: 651-642-1239

January 06, 2015

REVISION

Ms. Andrea Nord Barr Engineering Co. 4700 W 77th St Minneapolis, MN 55435

Work Order Number: 1405494 RE: 49161301

This is a revised report. The details of the revision are listed in the case narrative on the following page.

Enclosed are the results of analyses for samples received by the laboratory on 12/05/14. If you have any questions concerning this report, please feel free to contact me.

Results are not blank corrected unless noted within the report. Additionally, all QC results meet requirements unless noted.

All samples will be retained by Legend Technical Services, Inc., unless consumed in the analysis, at ambient conditions for 30 days from the date of this report and then discarded unless other arrangements are made. All samples were received in acceptable condition unless otherwise noted.

WI Certification #998022410

Prepared by, LEGEND TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC

Bach Pham Client Manager II bpham@legend-group.com

Legend Technical Services, Inc.

The results in this report apply to the samples analyzed in accordance with the chain of custody document. This analytical report must be reproduced in its entirety.



Barr Engineering Co.	Project:	49161301		
4700 W 77th St	Project Number:	49161301	Work Order #:	1405494
Minneapolis, MN 55435	Project Manager:	Ms. Andrea Nord	Date Reported:	01/06/15

ANALYTICAL REPORT FOR SAMPLES

Sample ID	Laboratory ID	Matrix	Date Sampled	Date Received
Manifold 225-S-1_3-3	1405494-01	Soil	12/04/14 13:30	12/05/14 09:10
Manifold 225-B-1_7.5-7.5	1405494-02	Soil	12/04/14 14:00	12/05/14 09:10
Manifold 225-S-2_4-4	1405494-03	Soil	12/04/14 14:15	12/05/14 09:10

Shipping Container Information	tion	
Default Cooler	Temperature (°C): 1.2	
Received on ice: Yes Received on melt water: No Custody seals: No	Temperature blank was present Ambient: No	Received on ice pack: No Acceptable (IH/ISO only): No

Case Narrative:

The dry weight correction and dilution applies to the sample result, MDL, and RL.

Ethylbenzene was present in the method blank between the MDL and RL for the BTEX analysis.

This report was revised on January 6, 2015 to include missing recoveries for the BTEX batch B4L0807 MS. This report supersedes the report dated December 15, 2014.

Barr Engineering Co.	Project:	49161301		
4700 W 77th St	Project Number:	49161301	Work Order #:	1405494
Minneapolis, MN 55435	Project Manager:	Ms. Andrea Nord	Date Reported:	01/06/15

WI(95) GRO/8015D Legend Technical Services, Inc.

Analyte	Result	RL	MDL	Units	Dilution	Batch	Prepared	Analyzed	Method	Notes
Manifold 225-S-1_3-3 (1405494-01)) Soil Sample	ed: 12/04	/14 13:30	Received:	12/05/14 9	:10				
1,2,4-Trimethylbenzene	0.0070	0.035	0.0038	mg/kg dry	1	B4L0807	12/08/14	12/08/14	WI(95) GRO	J
1,3,5-Trimethylbenzene	<0.0086	0.035	0.0086	mg/kg dry	1	"	"	"		
Benzene	0.011	0.035	0.0040	mg/kg dry	1	"	"		"	J
Ethylbenzene	0.024	0.035	0.0089	mg/kg dry	1	"	"		"	B-01, J
Naphthalene	<0.031	0.69	0.031	mg/kg dry	1	"	"		"	T-1
Toluene	0.012	0.035	0.0057	mg/kg dry	1		"		"	J
Xylenes (total)	0.034	0.10	0.020	mg/kg dry	1	"	"		"	J
Surrogate: 4-Fluorochlorobenzene	96.4			80-150 %		"	"	"	"	
Manifold 225-B-1_7.5-7.5 (1405494	-02) Soil Sar	npled: 1	2/04/14 14:	00 Receive	ed: 12/05/1	4 9:10				
1,2,4-Trimethylbenzene	0.0069	0.032	0.0035	mg/kg dry	1	B4L0807	12/08/14	12/08/14	WI(95) GRO	J
1,3,5-Trimethylbenzene	<0.0079	0.032	0.0079	mg/kg dry	1		"	"		
Benzene	0.034	0.032	0.0037	mg/kg dry	1		"	"		
Ethylbenzene	0.020	0.032	0.0082	mg/kg dry	1	"	"	"		B-01, J
Naphthalene	<0.028	0.64	0.028	mg/kg dry	1	"	"	"		T-1
Toluene	0.0081	0.032	0.0053	mg/kg dry	1		"	"		J
Xylenes (total)	<0.018	0.096	0.018	mg/kg dry	1		"	"		
Surrogate: 4-Fluorochlorobenzene	97.5			80-150 %		"	"	"	"	
Manifold 225-S-2_4-4 (1405494-03)) Soil Sample	ed: 12/04	/14 14:15	Received:	12/05/14 9	:10				
1,2,4-Trimethylbenzene	<0.0031	0.029	0.0031	mg/kg dry	1	B4L0807	12/08/14	12/08/14	WI(95) GRO	
1,3,5-Trimethylbenzene	<0.0071	0.029	0.0071	mg/kg dry	1			"	"	
Benzene	<0.0033	0.029	0.0033	mg/kg dry	1			"	"	
Ethylbenzene	0.017	0.029	0.0073	mg/kg dry	1		"	"	"	B-01, J
Naphthalene	<0.025	0.57	0.025	mg/kg dry	1	"	"	"	"	T-1
Toluene	<0.0047	0.029	0.0047	mg/kg dry	1		"	"	"	
Xylenes (total)	<0.016	0.086	0.016	mg/kg dry	1	"	"	"	"	
Surrogate: 4-Fluorochlorobenzene	96.2			80-150 %		"	"	"	"	

Barr Engineering Co.		Projec	t:	49161301						
4700 W 77th St		Projec	t Number:	49161301	l			Wo	rk Order #: 1	405494
Minneapolis, MN 55435		Projec	t Manager:	Ms. Andre	ea Nord			Dat	e Reported: 0	1/06/15
		Le		CENT S	OLIDS Services	Inc.				
Analyte	Result	RL	MDL	Units	Dilution	Batch	Prepared	Analyzed	Method	Notes
Manifold 225-S-1_3-3 (1405494-01) Soil	Sample	d: 12/04/1	4 13:30	Received:	12/05/14 9	:10				
% Solids	90			%	1	B4L1109	12/11/14	12/11/14	% calculation	
Manifold 225-B-1_7.5-7.5 (1405494-02)	Soil Sam	pled: 12/	04/14 14:0	0 Receiv	red: 12/05/1	4 9:10				
% Solids	78			%	1	B4L1109	12/11/14	12/11/14	% calculation	
Manifold 225-S-2_4-4 (1405494-03) Soil	Sample	d: 12/04/1	4 14:15	Received:	12/05/14 9	:10				
% Solids	97			%	1	B4L1109	12/11/14	12/11/14	% calculation	

Barr Engineering Co.	Project:	49161301		
4700 W 77th St	Project Number:	49161301	Work Order #:	1405494
Minneapolis, MN 55435	Project Manager:	Ms. Andrea Nord	Date Reported:	01/06/15

WI(95) GRO/8015D - Quality Control Legend Technical Services, Inc.

	_				Spike	Source		%REC		%RPD	
Analyte	Result	RL	MDL	Units	Level	Result	%REC	Limits	%RPD	Limit	Notes
Batch B4L0807 - EPA 5035 Soil (Purge	and Trap)									
Blank (B4L0807-BLK1)					Prepared	I & Analyze	ed: 12/08/1	4			
1,2,4-Trimethylbenzene	< 0.0027	0.025	0.0027	mg/kg wet							
1,3,5-Trimethylbenzene	< 0.0062	0.025	0.0062	mg/kg wet							
Benzene	< 0.0029	0.025	0.0029	mg/kg wet							
Ethylbenzene	0.0142	0.025	0.0064	mg/kg wet							B-02, J
Naphthalene	< 0.022	0.50	0.022	mg/kg wet							
Toluene	< 0.0041	0.025	0.0041	mg/kg wet							
Xylenes (total)	< 0.014	0.075	0.014	mg/kg wet							
Surrogate: 4-Fluorochlorobenzene	24.3			ug/L	25.0		97.2	80-150			
LCS (B4L0807-BS1)					Prepared	I & Analyze	ed: 12/08/1	4			
1,2,4-Trimethylbenzene	94.6			ug/L	100		94.6	80-120			
1,3,5-Trimethylbenzene	100			ug/L	100		100	80-120			
Benzene	104			ug/L	100		104	80-120			
Ethylbenzene	103			ug/L	100		103	80-120			
Naphthalene	81.3			ug/L	100		81.3	80-120			
Toluene	104			ug/L	100		104	80-120			
Xylenes (total)	314			ug/L	300		105	80-120			
Surrogate: 4-Fluorochlorobenzene	24.4			ug/L	25.0		97.6	80-150			
LCS Dup (B4L0807-BSD1)					Prepared	I: 12/08/14	Analyzed	: 12/09/14			
1,2,4-Trimethylbenzene	95.2			ug/L	100		95.2	80-120	0.682	20	
1,3,5-Trimethylbenzene	101			ug/L	100		101	80-120	0.860	20	
Benzene	106			ug/L	100		106	80-120	2.35	20	
Ethylbenzene	105			ug/L	100		105	80-120	1.99	20	
Naphthalene	81.3			ug/L	100		81.3	80-120	0.0135	20	
Toluene	106			ug/L	100		106	80-120	1.96	20	
Xylenes (total)	318			ug/L	300		106	80-120	1.31	20	
Surrogate: 4-Fluorochlorobenzene	24.4			ug/L	25.0		97.7	80-150			
Matrix Spike (B4L0807-MS1)	S	ource: 1	405494-	03	Prepared	I: 12/08/14	Analyzed	: 12/09/14			
1,2,4-Trimethylbenzene	99.4			ug/L	100	<	99.4	80-120			
1,3,5-Trimethylbenzene	103			ug/L	100	<	103	80-120			
Benzene	105			ug/L	100	<	105	80-120			
Ethylbenzene	106			ug/L	100	0.292	105	80-120			
Naphthalene	84.2			ug/L	100	<	84.2	80-120			
Toluene	105			ug/L	100	<	105	80-120			
Xylenes (total)	315			ug/L	300	0.161	105	80-120			
Surrogate: 4-Fluorochlorobenzene	24.1			ug/L	25.0		96.5	80-150			



Barr Engineering Co.	Project:	49161301		
4700 W 77th St	Project Number:	49161301	Work Order #:	1405494
Minneapolis, MN 55435	Project Manager:	Ms. Andrea Nord	Date Reported:	01/06/15

PERCENT SOLIDS - Quality Control Legend Technical Services, Inc.

Analyte	Result	RL	MDL	Units	Spike Level	Source Result	%REC	%REC Limits	%RPD	%RPD Limit	Notes
Batch B4L1109 - General Preparation											
Duplicate (B4L1109-DUP1)	S	ource: 1	405525-0	2	Prepared	l & Analyze	ed: 12/11/1	4			
% Solids	57.0			%		59.0			3.45	20	

Barr Engineering Co.	Project:	49161301		
4700 W 77th St	Project Number:	49161301	Work Order #:	1405494
Minneapolis, MN 55435	Project Manager:	Ms. Andrea Nord	Date Reported:	01/06/15

Notes and Definitions

T-1	MDH does not offer certification for this parameter.
	merri dece net ener certineation for the parameter.

- J Parameter was present between the MDL and RL and should be considered an estimated value
- B-02 Target analyte was present in the method blank between the MDL and RL.
- B-01 Analyte was present in the method blank. Sample result is less than or equal to 10 times the blank concentration.
- < Less than value listed
- dry Sample results reported on a dry weight basis
- NA Not applicable. The %RPD is not calculated from values less than the reporting limit.
- MDL Method Detection Limit
- RL Reporting Limit
- RPD Relative Percent Difference
- LCS Laboratory Control Spike = Blank Spike (BS) = Laboratory Fortified Blank (LFB)
- MS Matrix Spike = Laboratory Fortified Matrix (LFM)

Chain of 4700 West 77th	Street	_		14	0540	14		ł.			amber o	of Conti	ainers	Pres	47.54	ve	T	coc _/	_ of			w w w . e g e
Minneapolis, M7 (952) 832-2600	-	-						_								16		Project Manager:RE	5E			0
Project Number: 49/61							_	-		1	0			1		Unlore	¢IS			-		gen
Project Name: Enbridge	-/	Mais	old	205 Re	spanse_				2.0	(HNO ₂)	0.003 (H) (H)		141	(pan)	42	A aphies	ontain	Project QC Contact:	ÂĄ	N		nd-group
Sample Origination State WT	(use two	letter	postal s	tate abbreviation)					1.151	n Z]	Organics SO ₄) #4		(HOs)	UTEX (lated MeOB) 4 (lated unpreserved)	(unpreserved) #2	E)	Of C		Tr	0		g r o
COC Number:					N	-	354	-	(CI) #	tals (H	Range Orgat ts (H2SO4)		Ired M	red un	sardun	(plastic	mber	Sampled by:	- 20	204		u p
Location	Start Depth	Stop Depth	Depth Unit (m./fl. or in,)	Date	Collection Time (hh:mm)	Matris January January Matris	Citro A	Comp. 1dd	VOC5 (H SVOC= (Dissolved Total Me	Diesel R Natricols		VOCs (h	DRO (la	SVOCE (PUDC (Total Nu	Sampled by:	leq	nd		www.legend-group.com
Manifold 225-5-1	3	3	f†	10/4/14	1330	A	6									12	3	PVX.(-mB	E), /	Naphthale	101 A	
	7,5	75	f+	12/4/14	1400	×	h									12	3			2	62.	
Maifold 225-3-1 Naifold 225-5-2	4	4.	Ft	12/4/14	1415	×	×									12	3	1	-		53	
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5.										1			T					1.5			1	
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10.																				_	Form 200	
			4	Relinquished By:			in Ice		Date		me	Receive	d bu-					Date	-	-	Custody	-
Common Parameter/Container			NCY	12 11	En	0	P) N	12	14114	150	202		a site					Date		Time	hain Of	2 ? c
 Volatile Organics = BTEX, GRO Semivolatile Organics = PAHs, F Full List, Herbicide/Pesticide/PGI General = pH, Chloride, Fluorid 	CP, Dica 34	ins, 8270		Relinquished By:		0/	NNN N		Date	Т	ime	Redive	th	11	2 De	be	4	12/5/U	4 9	Time 110	DFORMSID	
 General = pH, Chioriae, Fluoriai TDS, TS, Sulfate Nutrients = COD, TOC, Phenola 				Samples Shipped	VIA: 🗌 Air F	- P	Fedd	ral 1	Express	Sa	npler	Air Bill	Num	bet		1.0	102	2 2	1.00		ALGISTIC	

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Attachment D

Waste Management Documentation



Waste Profile Sheet



P.O. Number	Customer Code	SK	B Represe	entative	CL	L					
I. Generator Information	on										
Generator Name: Enbridge Pipe Partnership, LLC	lines Limited	Generator EP	A ID Num	ber		s	SIC Code				
Generator Location: Enbridge Superior Terminal - 141203	County: Douglas	Generator Co	ntact: Al	ex Smith							
Manifold 225		Phone: 715	-398-47	95 Fa:	x: 832-3	25-5511					
Generator Mailing Address (if differen Superior, WI 54880	nt: 1320 Grand Ave,	Generator Email Address: alex.smith@enbridge.com									
Bill To Name & Address: Enbridge Energy, 1100 Louisiana Ave,	e Bill To #: STE.	Billing Contac	t: Alex	Smith							
3300, Houston, TX 77002		Phone: 715	-398-47	95 Fa:	x: 832-32	25-5511					
Invoice Contact:		Billing Email /	Address:	alex.smith@enbridg	e.com						
II. Waste Generation In	formation										
Waste Name: Crude contamina	ated soil - 141203 Mani	fold 225		ted rate of waste generations.				e time arly			
Generator Facility Operations and/or	Site History: Enbridge Pi	peline Termina									
Describe the generating process or s	source of contaminated soil/c	debris and/or wa	ste: Pip	eline Terminal Activitie	S						
	and Constituents (list all k	nown)					Actual Rang	ge ppm			
Crude contaminated soil							100				
IV. Waste Properties	and limited	Denner	Fleek		Colori		Odar (da	a a rih a \:			
Solid Liquid [] Yes ⊠ No □	Range: <2 □ 2-4 5-8 □ 8-12. >12.5	4 □ ≤	point: 140°F 140°F to < 200°F 200°F	Color: Brown		Odor (de petrolei odor				
V. Waste Classification	1										
Waste stream properties (answe				Does this waste cont			🗌 Yes	X No			
Does this waste stream contain a hazardous waste, either in pure		as Ves	🛛 No	Is this waste lethal (b 7045.0131 Subp. 6)?		lules	🗌 Yes	🛛 No			
treatment residue?	DOD motorial				1-0						
Does this waste stream contain		Yes	🛛 No	Is this waste recyclat Is this waste explosiv			∐ Yes ☐ Yes	⊠ No ⊠ No			
If yes, concentration: Does this waste stream contain t	ppm fuming acids?	T Yes	No No	Is this waste infectiou			☐ Yes	No			
Does this waste contain asbesto		☐ Yes	No	Is this putrescible wa			☐ Yes	No			
Does this waste contain oxidizer	s?	Yes	No No	Is this waste demoliti		?	Tes 1	No No			
Does this waste contain radioact		🗌 Yes		Is this waste sewer s			🗌 Yes	🛛 No			
Please attach any available inf							stantiates	these			
VI. Shipping Informatio	nations. Include MSDS's a	nd any informa	tion from	other agencies (i.e., Mi	PCA, USEI	PA)					
Proper DOT Shipping Name (per CF)									
Reportable Quantity	DOT Hazard Class	UN/NA Nur	mber		Packing	Group					
Method of packaging: 🔲 drums (si	ze)	Method of s		nd dump 🔲 Rail 🔲	Other (Sr	pecify)					
Bulk Solids Doxes (siz	ze)				oulei (op						
	Hazardous Waste & Appro										
I hereby certify and warrant, on beha and true and that the waste is nonha	zardous as defined in Title 4	2, Unites States	Code Se	ction 6903, Minnesota Sta							
and/or any rules adopted by the Minr I understand that any approval is no					re have her	en change	e in the con	aposition			
of the waste. Therefore, if the compo											
notify SKB Environmental. I, on beha	alf of the generator, hereby a										
of this certification being inaccurate of	or untrue.										
1111/200	Alex Sm	ith		Environmental	Analyst		1-70	15			
Signature	Printed Na			Title	Analyst		Date				
							Duto				



December 16, 2014

REVISION

Ms. Andrea Nord Barr Engineering Co. 4700 W 77th St Minneapolis, MN 55435

Work Order Number: 1405493 RE: 49161301

This is a revised report. The details of the revision are listed in the case narrative on the following page.

Enclosed are the results of analyses for samples received by the laboratory on 12/05/14. If you have any questions concerning this report, please feel free to contact me.

Results are not blank corrected unless noted within the report. Additionally, all QC results meet requirements unless noted.

All samples will be retained by Legend Technical Services, Inc., unless consumed in the analysis, at ambient conditions for 30 days from the date of this report and then discarded unless other arrangements are made. All samples were received in acceptable condition unless otherwise noted.

WI Certification #998022410

Prepared by, LEGEND TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC

Bach Pham Client Manager II bpham@legend-group.com

Legend Technical Services, Inc.

The results in this report apply to the samples analyzed in accordance with the chain of custody document. This analytical report must be reproduced in its entirety.

Barr Engineering Co. 4700 W 77th St Minneapolis, MN 55435	Project: 49161301 Project Number: 49161301 Project Manager: Ms. Andrea	ı Nord	Work O Date Re	rder #: 1405493 ported: 12/16/14
	ANALYTICAL REPORT	FOR SAMPLES		
Sample ID	Labora	ory ID Matrix	Date Sampled	Date Received
Manifold225-Stockpile-1	14054	93-01 Soil	12/03/14 12:00	12/05/14 09:10
Manifold225-Stockpile-2	14054	93-02 Soil	12/03/14 12:05	12/05/14 09:10

Shipping Container Information

Default Cooler	Temperature (°C): 0.9	
Received on ice: Yes Received on melt water: No	Temperature blank was present Ambient: No	Received on ice pack: No Acceptable (IH/ISO only): No
Custody seals: No		

Case Narrative:

The dry weight correction and dilution applies to the sample result, MDL, and RL.

Ethylbenzene was present in the method blank between the MDL and RL for the BTEX analysis.

Recoveries of the DRO surrogates for both samples were not available due to sample dilution required from high analyte concentration. The DRO chromatograms fro both samples are attached.

At the client's request, this report was revised on December 16, 2014 to include TCLP benzene and flashpoint analyses for both samples. WI Accreditation #998022410 does not apply to either of these analyses. This report supersedes the report dated December 11, 2014.



Barr Engineering Co.	Project:	49161301		
4700 W 77th St	Project Number:	49161301	Work Order #:	1405493
Minneapolis, MN 55435	Project Manager:	Ms. Andrea Nord	Date Reported:	12/16/14

DRO/8015D Legend Technical Services, Inc.

Analyte	Result	RL	MDL	Units	Dilution	Batch	Prepared	Analyzed	Method	Notes
Manifold225-Stockpile-1 (1405493-01)	Soil Sam	pled: 12	2/03/14 12:0	0 Receive	ed: 12/05/1	4 9:10				
Diesel Range Organics	14000	1300	210	mg/kg dry	100	B4L0904	12/09/14	12/10/14	WI(95) DRO	L1
Surrogate: Triacontane (C-30)				70-130 %		"	"	"	"	D-1
Manifold225-Stockpile-2 (1405493-02)	Soil Sam	pled: 12	2/03/14 12:0	05 Receive	ed: 12/05/1	4 9:10				
Diesel Range Organics	8600	1200	190	mg/kg dry	100	B4L0904	12/09/14	12/10/14	WI(95) DRO	L1
Surrogate: Triacontane (C-30)				70-130 %		"	"	"	"	D-1

Barr Engineering Co.		Pro	oject:	49161301						
4700 W 77th St		Pro	ject Number:	49161301				Woi	rk Order #:	1405493
Minneapolis, MN 55435		Pro	ject Manager:	Ms. Andre	a Nord		12/16/14			
			WI(9	5) GRO/	8015D					
			Legend Teo	chnical S	Services	, Inc.				
Analyte	Result	RL	MDL	Units	Dilution	Batch	Prepared	Analyzed	Method	Notes
Manifold225-Stockpile-1 (1405493-01) So	oil San	npled:	12/03/14 12:00	Receive	ed: 12/05/1	4 9:10				
Benzene	56	0.36	0.042	mg/kg dry	10	B4L0514	12/05/14	12/06/14	WI(95) GRO	
Ethylbenzene	18	0.36	0.092	mg/kg dry	10		"		"	
Toluene	110	0.36	0.059	mg/kg dry	10		"		"	
Xylenes (total)	130	1.1	0.20	mg/kg dry	10		"		"	
Surrogate: 4-Fluorochlorobenzene	114			80-150 %		"	"	"	"	
Manifold225-Stockpile-2 (1405493-02) So	oil San	npled:	12/03/14 12:05	Receive	d: 12/05/1	4 9:10				W-03
Benzene	40	0.38	0.044	mg/kg dry	10	B4L0514	12/05/14	12/06/14	WI(95) GRO	
Ethylbenzene	13	0.38	0.097	mg/kg dry	10	"	"	"	"	
Toluene	79	0.38	0.062	mg/kg dry	10	"	"	"	"	
Xylenes (total)	91	1.1	0.22	mg/kg dry	10		"	"	"	

80-150 %

"

"

"

"

Surrogate: 4-Fluorochlorobenzene

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Barr Engineering Co. 4700 W 77th St Minneapolis, MN 55435		,	ect: 4 ect Number: 4 ect Manager: 1		1				rk Order #: e Reported:	1405493
		L	PERC egend Tecl	ENT S	OLIDS Services					
Analyte	Result	RL	MDL	Units	Dilution	Batch	Prepared	Analyzed	Method	Notes
Manifold225-Stockpile-1 (1405493-01)	Soil Sam	ipled: 1	2/03/14 12:00	Receiv	ed: 12/05/1	4 9:10				
% Solids	87			%	1	B4L0517	12/05/14	12/08/14	% calculation	ı
Manifold225-Stockpile-2 (1405493-02)	Soil Sam	pled: 1	2/03/14 12:05	Receiv	ed: 12/05/1	4 9:10				
% Solids	94			%	1	B4L0517	12/05/14	12/08/14	% calculatior	ı

Barr Engineering Co.		Proje	ect:	49161301						
4700 W 77th St		Proje	ect Number:	49161301				Woi	rk Order #:	1405493
Minneapolis, MN 55435		Proje	ect Manage	r: Ms. Andre	: Ms. Andrea Nord				e Reported:	12/16/14
				TCLP VC	C					
		L	egend To	echnical S	Services	, Inc.				
Analyte	Result	RL	MDL	Units	Dilution	Batch	Prepared	Analyzed	Method	Notes
Manifold225-Stockpile-1 (1405493-	01) Soil Sam	pled: 12	2/03/14 12:0	00 Receive	d: 12/05/1	4 9:10				
Benzene	0.67	0.10	0.0048	mg/L	1	B4L1608	12/15/14	12/16/14	EPA 1311/8260B	
Surrogate: 4-Bromofluorobenzene	93.8			80-120 %		"	"	"	"	
Surrogate: Dibromofluoromethane	92.7			80-120 %		"	"	"	"	
Surrogate: Toluene-d8	90.9			80-120 %		"	"	"	"	
Manifold225-Stockpile-2 (1405493-	02) Soil Sam	pled: 12	2/03/14 12:0	05 Receive	d: 12/05/1	4 9:10				
Benzene	0.12	0.10	0.0048	mg/L	1	B4L1608	12/15/14	12/16/14	EPA 1311/8260B	
Surrogate: 4-Bromofluorobenzene	94.4			80-120 %		"	"	"	"	
Surrogate: Dibromofluoromethane	91.8			80-120 %		"	"	"	"	
Surrogate: Toluene-d8	92.7			80-120 %		"	"	"	"	

Barr Engineering Co.		Projec	ct:	49161301	1					
4700 W 77th St		Projec	ct Number:	49161301	1			Wo	rk Order #: 1	405493
Minneapolis, MN 55435		Projec	ct Manager:	Ms. Andre	ea Nord			Dat	e Reported: 1	2/16/14
		Le	ANALY egend Tec		RESULTS Services					
Analyte	Result	RL	MDL	Units	Dilution	Batch	Prepared	Analyzed	Method	Notes
Manifold225-Stockpile-1 (14	05493-01) Soil Samp	oled: 12/	/03/14 12:00	Receiv	ed: 12/05/1	4 9:10				
Flashpoint	> 200			°F	1	B4L1506	12/16/14	12/16/14	EPA 1010A/ASTM D93(M)	
Manifold225-Stockpile-2 (14	05493-02) Soil Samp	oled: 12/	/03/14 12:05	Receiv	ed: 12/05/1	4 9:10				
Flashpoint	> 200			°F	1	B4L1506	12/16/14	12/16/14	EPA 1010A/ASTM D93(M)	



Barr Engineering Co.	Project:	49161301		
4700 W 77th St	Project Number:	49161301	Work Order #:	1405493
Minneapolis, MN 55435	Project Manager:	Ms. Andrea Nord	Date Reported:	12/16/14

DRO/8015D - Quality Control Legend Technical Services, Inc.

Analyte	Result	RL	MDL	Units	Spike Level	Source Result	%REC	%REC Limits	%RPD	%RPD Limit	Notes
Batch B4L0904 - Sonication (Wisc DR0))										
Blank (B4L0904-BLK1)				F	Prepared	1: 12/09/14	Analyzed	I: 12/10/14			
Diesel Range Organics	< 1.3	8.0	1.3	mg/kg wet							
Surrogate: Triacontane (C-30)	15.3			mg/kg wet	16.0		95.9	70-130			
LCS (B4L0904-BS1)				F	Prepared	1: 12/09/14	Analyzec	I: 12/10/14			
Diesel Range Organics	49.1	8.0	1.3	mg/kg wet	64.0		76.7	70-120			
Surrogate: Triacontane (C-30)	12.5			mg/kg wet	16.0		78.3	70-130			
LCS Dup (B4L0904-BSD1)				F	Prepared	1: 12/09/14	Analyzec	I: 12/10/14			
Diesel Range Organics	55.8	8.0	1.3	mg/kg wet	64.0		87.2	70-120	12.8	20	
Surrogate: Triacontane (C-30)	15.7			mg/kg wet	16.0		97.8	70-130			



Barr Engineering Co.	Project:	49161301		
4700 W 77th St	Project Number:	49161301	Work Order #:	1405493
Minneapolis, MN 55435	Project Manager:	Ms. Andrea Nord	Date Reported:	12/16/14

WI(95) GRO/8015D - Quality Control Legend Technical Services, Inc.

Analyte	Result	RL	MDL	Units	Spike Level	Source Result	%REC	%REC Limits	%RPD	%RPD Limit	Notes
Batch B4L0514 - EPA 5035 Soil (Purge and Trap)									
Blank (B4L0514-BLK1)		-			Prepared	& Analyze	ed: 12/05/*	14			
Benzene	< 0.0029	0.025	0.0029	mg/kg wet		-					
Ethylbenzene	0.0147	0.025	0.0064	mg/kg wet							B-02, J
Toluene	< 0.0041	0.025	0.0041	mg/kg wet							
Xylenes (total)	< 0.014	0.075	0.014	mg/kg wet							
Surrogate: 4-Fluorochlorobenzene	24.1			ug/L	25.0		96.5	80-150			
LCS (B4L0514-BS1)					Preparec	& Analyze	ed: 12/05/	14			
Benzene	95.5			ug/L	100		95.5	80-120			
Ethylbenzene	95.8			ug/L	100		95.8	80-120			
Toluene	96.1			ug/L	100		96.1	80-120			
Xylenes (total)	287			ug/L	300		95.6	80-120			
Surrogate: 4-Fluorochlorobenzene	24.3			ug/L	25.0		97.1	80-150			
LCS Dup (B4L0514-BSD1)					Preparec	1: 12/05/14	Analyzed	d: 12/06/14	ļ		
Benzene	96.2			ug/L	100		96.2	80-120	0.812	20	
Ethylbenzene	96.2			ug/L	100		96.2	80-120	0.441	20	
Toluene	96.9			ug/L	100		96.9	80-120	0.776	20	
Xylenes (total)	286			ug/L	300		95.5	80-120	0.125	20	
Surrogate: 4-Fluorochlorobenzene	24.6			ug/L	25.0		98.3	80-150			
Matrix Spike (B4L0514-MS1)	S	ource: 1	405489-	01	Preparec	1: 12/05/14	Analyzed	1: 12/06/14	Ļ		
Benzene	95.4			ug/L	100	<	95.4	80-120			
Ethylbenzene	97.6			ug/L	100	0.313	97.3	80-120			
Toluene	96.5			ug/L	100	<	96.5	80-120			
Xylenes (total)	293			ug/L	300	0.189	97.7	80-120			
Surrogate: 4-Fluorochlorobenzene	24.9			ug/L	25.0		99.5	80-150			



Barr Engineering Co.	Project:	49161301		
4700 W 77th St	Project Number:	49161301	Work Order #:	1405493
Minneapolis, MN 55435	Project Manager:	Ms. Andrea Nord	Date Reported:	12/16/14

PERCENT SOLIDS - Quality Control Legend Technical Services, Inc.

Analyte	Result	RL	MDL	Units	Spike Level	Source Result	%REC	%REC Limits	%RPD	%RPD Limit	Notes
Batch B4L0517 - General Preparation											
Duplicate (B4L0517-DUP1)	S	ource: 1	405444-04	4	Prepared	: 12/05/14	Analyzed	1: 12/08/14			
% Solids	97.0			%		97.0			0.00	20	
Duplicate (B4L0517-DUP2)	S	ource: 1	405493-0	2	Prepared	: 12/05/14	Analyzed	1: 12/08/14			
% Solids	89.0			%		94.0			5.46	20	



Barr Engineering Co.	Project:	49161301		
4700 W 77th St	Project Number:	49161301	Work Order #:	1405493
Minneapolis, MN 55435	Project Manager:	Ms. Andrea Nord	Date Reported:	12/16/14

TCLP VOC - Quality Control Legend Technical Services, Inc.

Analyte	Result	RL	MDL	Units	Spike Level	Source Result	%REC	%REC Limits	%RPD	%RPD Limit	Notes
Analyte	Result	κL	INDL	Units	Levei	Result	%REC	LIIIIIIS	%RFD	LIITIIL	notes
Batch B4L1608 - EPA 5030 TCLP											
Blank (B4L1608-BLK1)					Prepared	1: 12/15/14	Analyzed	d: 12/16/14			
Benzene	< 0.10	0.10	0.0048	mg/L							
Surrogate: 4-Bromofluorobenzene	46.5			ug/L	50.0		93.0	80-120			
Surrogate: Dibromofluoromethane	46.5			ug/L	50.0		93.1	80-120			
Surrogate: Toluene-d8	45.3			ug/L	50.0		90.7	80-120			
LCS (B4L1608-BS1)					Prepared	& Analyze	ed: 12/15/	14			
Benzene	45.9			ug/L	50.0		91.7	80-120			
Surrogate: 4-Bromofluorobenzene	49.4			ug/L	50.0		98.9	80-120			
Surrogate: Dibromofluoromethane	45.5			ug/L	50.0		90.9	80-120			
Surrogate: Toluene-d8	46.2			ug/L	50.0		92.5	80-120			
Matrix Spike (B4L1608-MS1)	S	ource:	1405493-0	1	Prepared	1: 12/15/14	Analyzed	1: 12/16/14			
Benzene	52.8			ug/L	50.0	6.66	92.3	80-120			
Surrogate: 4-Bromofluorobenzene	50.3			ug/L	50.0		101	80-120			
Surrogate: Dibromofluoromethane	47.5			ug/L	50.0		95.0	80-120			
Surrogate: Toluene-d8	47.8			ug/L	50.0		95.6	80-120			
Matrix Spike Dup (B4L1608-MSD1)	S	ource:	1405493-0	1	Prepared	1: 12/15/14	Analyzed	d: 12/16/14			
Benzene	53.2			ug/L	50.0	6.66	93.0	80-120	0.730	20	
Surrogate: 4-Bromofluorobenzene	49.7			ug/L	50.0		99.4	80-120			
Surrogate: Dibromofluoromethane	46.7			ug/L	50.0		93.3	80-120			
Surrogate: Toluene-d8	47.0			ug/L	50.0		94.1	80-120			



Barr Engineering Co.	Project:	49161301		
4700 W 77th St	Project Number:	49161301	Work Order #:	1405493
Minneapolis, MN 55435	Project Manager:	Ms. Andrea Nord	Date Reported:	12/16/14

ANALYTICAL RESULTS - Quality Control Legend Technical Services, Inc.

Analyte	Result	RL	MDL	Units	Spike Level	Source Result	%REC	%REC Limits	%RPD	%RPD Limit	Notes
Batch B4L1506 - General Prep											
Reference (B4L1506-SRM1)					Prepared	& Analyze	ed: 12/16/ [,]	14			
Flashpoint	78.0			°F	77.0		101	97.5-102.5			

Barr Engineering Co.	Project:	49161301		
4700 W 77th St	Project Number:	49161301	Work Order #:	1405493
Minneapolis, MN 55435	Project Manager:	Ms. Andrea Nord	Date Reported:	12/16/14


Notes and Definitions

W-03	The initial sample weight was less than 8.0 grams.
L1	Results in the diesel organics range are primarily due to overlap from a heavy oil range product.
J	Parameter was present between the MDL and RL and should be considered an estimated value
D-1	The surrogate recovery for this sample is not available due to sample dilution required from high analyte concentration and/or matrix interferences.
B-02	Target analyte was present in the method blank between the MDL and RL.
<	Less than value listed
dry	Sample results reported on a dry weight basis
NA	Not applicable. The %RPD is not calculated from values less than the reporting limit.
MDL	Method Detection Limit
RL	Reporting Limit
RPD	Relative Percent Difference
LCS	Laboratory Control Spike = Blank Spike (BS) = Laboratory Fortified Blank (LFB)


MS Matrix Spike = Laboratory Fortified Matrix (LFM)

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




Legend Technical Services, Inc.

The results in this report apply to the samples analyzed in accordance with the chain of custody document. This analytical report must be reproduced in its entirety.





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January 16, 2015

Mr. James E. Taraldsen Barr Engineering Co. 4700 W 77th St Minneapolis, MN 55435

Work Order Number: 1500075 RE: 49161301

Enclosed are the results of analyses for samples received by the laboratory on 01/09/15. If you have any questions concerning this report, please feel free to contact me.

Results are not blank corrected unless noted within the report. Additionally, all QC results meet requirements unless noted.

All samples will be retained by Legend Technical Services, Inc., unless consumed in the analysis, at ambient conditions for 30 days from the date of this report and then discarded unless other arrangements are made. All samples were received in acceptable condition unless otherwise noted.

All test results and QC meet requirements of the 2003 NELAC standard.

MDH (NELAP) Accreditation #027-123-295

Prepared by, LEGEND TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC

> Bach Pham Client Manager II bpham@legend-group.com

Legend Technical Services, Inc.

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Barr Engineering Co.	Project:	49161301			
4700 W 77th St	Project Number:	49161301.00 100 001		Work Or	rder #: 1500075
Minneapolis, MN 55435	Project Manager:	Mr. James E. Taraldse	'n	Date Re	eported: 01/16/15
	ANALYTICAL F	REPORT FOR SAM	IPLES		
Sample ID		Laboratory ID	Matrix	Date Sampled	Date Received
Manifold 225-Stockpile-3		1500075-01	Soil	01/08/15 08:15	01/09/15 09:45
Manifold 225-Stockpile-4		1500075-02	Soil	01/08/15 08:20	01/09/15 09:45
Shipping Container Informa	tion				
Default Cooler	Temperature (°C): 0.9				
Received on ice: Yes Received on melt water: No	Temperature blank w Ambient: No	vas present		d on ice pack: No ble (IH/ISO only): No)

Case Narrative:

Custody seals: Yes

Barr Engineering Co.	Project:	49161301		
4700 W 77th St	Project Number:	49161301.00 100 001	Work Order #:	1500075
Minneapolis, MN 55435	Project Manager	Mr. James E. Taraldsen	Date Reported:	01/16/15

TCLP VOC Legend Technical Services, Inc.

Analyte	Result	RL	MDL	Units	Dilution	Batch	Prepared	Analyzed	Method	Notes
Manifold 225-Stockpile-3 (1500075-	-01) Soil San	npled: 0	1/08/15 08:	15 Receiv	ed: 01/09/ ⁻	15 9:45				
Benzene	<0.10	0.10	0.0048	mg/L	1	B5A1616	01/15/15	01/15/15	EPA 1311/8260B	
Surrogate: 4-Bromofluorobenzene	93.0			80-120 %		"	"	"	"	
Surrogate: Dibromofluoromethane	94.6			80-120 %		"	"	"	"	
Surrogate: Toluene-d8	93.7			80-120 %		"	"	"	"	
Manifold 225-Stockpile-4 (1500075	-02) Soil San	npled: 0	1/08/15 08:	20 Receiv	ed: 01/09/ [·]	15 9:45				
Benzene	<0.10	0.10	0.0048	mg/L	1	B5A1616	01/15/15	01/15/15	EPA 1311/8260B	
Surrogate: 4-Bromofluorobenzene	90.8			80-120 %		"	"	"	"	
Surrogate: Dibromofluoromethane	96.9			80-120 %		"	"	"	"	
Surrogate: Toluene-d8	94.2			80-120 %		"	"	"	"	



Barr Engineering Co.	Project: 49161301	
4700 W 77th St	Project Number: 49161301.00 100 001	Work Order #: 1500075
Minneapolis, MN 55435	Project Manager: Mr. James E. Taraldsen	Date Reported: 01/16/15

TCLP VOC - Quality Control Legend Technical Services, Inc.

Analyte	Result	RL	MDL	Units	Spike Level	Source Result	%REC	%REC Limits	%RPD	%RPD Limit	Notes
Batch B5A1616 - EPA 5030 TCLP											
Blank (B5A1616-BLK1)					Prepared	& Analyz	ed: 01/15/ [,]	15			
Benzene	< 0.10	0.10	0.0048	mg/L	·						
Surrogate: 4-Bromofluorobenzene	46.0			ug/L	50.0		92.1	80-120			
Surrogate: Dibromofluoromethane	47.5			ug/L	50.0		95.1	80-120			
Surrogate: Toluene-d8	47.2			ug/L	50.0		94.5	80-120			
LCS (B5A1616-BS1)					Prepared	& Analyz	ed: 01/15/	15			
Benzene	48.2			ug/L	50.0		96.5	80-120			
Surrogate: 4-Bromofluorobenzene	46.8			ug/L	50.0		93.5	80-120			
Surrogate: Dibromofluoromethane	47.6			ug/L	50.0		95.3	80-120			
Surrogate: Toluene-d8	47.2			ug/L	50.0		94.3	80-120			
Matrix Spike (B5A1616-MS1)	S	ource:	1500075-0)1	Prepared	& Analyz	ed: 01/15/ [,]	15			
Benzene	48.9			ug/L	50.0	<	97.7	80-120			
Surrogate: 4-Bromofluorobenzene	47.6			ug/L	50.0		95.1	80-120			
Surrogate: Dibromofluoromethane	48.2			ug/L	50.0		96.3	80-120			
Surrogate: Toluene-d8	46.9			ug/L	50.0		93.8	80-120			
Matrix Spike Dup (B5A1616-MSD1)	S	ource:	1500075-0)1	Prepared	& Analyz	ed: 01/15/ [,]	15			
Benzene	48.4			ug/L	50.0	<	96.8	80-120	1.00	20	
Surrogate: 4-Bromofluorobenzene	46.6			ug/L	50.0		93.3	80-120			
Surrogate: Dibromofluoromethane	47.5			ug/L	50.0		95.1	80-120			
Surrogate: Toluene-d8	46.8			ug/L	50.0		93.5	80-120			




Barr Engineering Co.	Project:	49161301		
4700 W 77th St	Project Number:	49161301.00 100 001	Work Order #:	1500075
Minneapolis, MN 55435	Project Manager:	Mr. James E. Taraldsen	Date Reported:	01/16/15

Notes and Definitions

- < Less than value listed
- dry Sample results reported on a dry weight basis
- NA Not applicable. The %RPD is not calculated from values less than the reporting limit.
- MDL Method Detection Limit
- RL Reporting Limit
- RPD Relative Percent Difference
- LCS Laboratory Control Spike = Blank Spike (BS) = Laboratory Fortified Blank (LFB)
- MS Matrix Spike = Laboratory Fortified Matrix (LFM)

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Notification of Waste Acceptance

1/21/2015

CUSTOMER INFORMATION

EPA ID#: Enbridge Superior Terminal Manifold 225

Superior Terminal 141203 Superior, WI 54880 Contact: Alex Smith Phone: (715) 398-4795

INVOICE INFORMATION

Bill #: 2133 Enbridge Pipelines Limited Partnership, Abcounts Payable

1100 Louisiana Ave, Ste 3300 Houston, TX 77002 Contact: Alex Smith Phone: (715) 398-4795

Profile Sheet #: Waste Stream #: CL15-0001 Waste Name: Crude Contaminated Soil Manifold 225

Thank you for selecting SHAMROCK LANDFILL for your waste management requirements. Your waste stream has been reviewed and is acceptable for management at our facility based on the information provided in the profile sheet number listed above and conditions below. Our facility has the necessary permits to allow the storage, treatment, or disposal of this waste. The above referenced acceptance number should be listed on all shipping documents and correspondence. Please retain these documents for your records and future reference.

To schedule a shipment, or should you have any questions, please contact the facility at (218) 878-0112.

ACCEPTANCE INFORMATION

The waste stream identified by the reference above is acceptable for disposal. The anticipated frequency of shipment is 40 TONS / ONE TIME ONLY

This waste is acceptable for delivery beginning on 1/21/2015 thru 1/20/2017 at which time the material will need to be reanalyzed and recertified.

PCB Statement: The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency encourages generators of non-hazardous PCB waste to voluntarily manage the waste as hazardous waste or to seek an alternative to land disposal such as incineration

Spill Reporting Reminder: Proper County and MPCA spill reporting procedures must be followed.

Empty Container Statement: Each shipment containing empty containers must be accompanied with a completed 'EMPTY CONTAINER CERTIFICATION FORM'.

Free Liquid Statement: Free liquids will not be placed in cells at Shamrock Landfill. Free liquids must be solidified either prior to shipment to Shamrock Landfill or at Shamrock Landfill.

Shipping Requirements A NON-HAZARDOUS certificate is required to be on file, certifying the waste is non-hazardous as specified per 40 CFR 261.4. The shipment must be accompanied with an Shamrock Landfill manifest.

AUTHORIZATION

Approval:

Date:

P.O. Box 338 • Esko, MN 55733-0338 Main: 218.878.0112 • Fax: 218.879.2120



PRINTED ON (DATE):

Tons Each Load By WSID Tonnage for EACH LOAD, grouped by customer 01/01/2015 to 02/05/2015 Thursday, February 05, 2015

ENB24

Enbridge Superior Terminal Superior Terminal 141203 Superior WI 54880

28221 (A) 7753 1/27/2015 CL15-0001 Crude Contaminated Soil Manifold 2 2A Y44 1190 11.46 28223 (A) 7751 1/27/2015 CL15-0001 Crude Contaminated Soil Manifold 2 2A Y44 1190 14.25 28233 (A) 7750 1/27/2015 CL15-0001 Crude Contaminated Soil Manifold 2 2A Y44 1190 14.25 28233 (A) 7750 1/27/2015 CL15-0001 Crude Contaminated Soil Manifold 2 2A Y44 1190 13.63					Total # of Loads: 4 Total Tons:		51.57		
28221 (A) 7753 1/27/2015 CL15-0001 Crude Contaminated Soil Manifold 2 2A Y44 1190 11.46 28223 (A) 7751 1/27/2015 CL15-0001 Crude Contaminated Soil Manifold 2 2A Y44 1190 14.25	28234 (A)	7759	1/27/2015	CL15-0001	Crude Contaminated Soil Manifold 2	2A	Y44	1190	12.23
28221 (A) 7753 1/27/2015 CL15-0001 Crude Contaminated Soil Manifold 2 2A Y44 1190 11.46	28233 (A)	7750	1/27/2015	CL15-0001	Crude Contaminated Soil Manifold 2	2A	Y44	1190	13.63
	28223 (A)	7751	1/27/2015	CL15-0001	Crude Contaminated Soil Manifold 2	2A	Y44	1190	14.25
LOAD # MANIFEST ARRIVED WASTE STREAM WASTE NAME CELL SPOT. LIFT TONS	28221 (A)	7753	1/27/2015	CL15-0001	Crude Contaminated Soil Manifold 2	2A	Y44	1190	11.46
	LOAD #	MANIFEST	ARRIVED	WASTE STREAM	WASTE NAME	CELL	SPOT.	LIFT	TONS

Grand Total (Tons):51.57Grand Total (Loads):4





Technical Memorandum

To:Alex Smith, Enbridge EnergyFrom:Ryan Erickson and Greg PattenSubject:Superior Terminal Manifold 225 Release Contaminated Soil ManagementDate:January 26, 2015Project:49161301

On December 12, 2014, approximately 100 gallons of crude oil was released onto the ground surface from a 2-inch pipe on Manifold 225 during maintenance activities at the Superior Terminal. Enbridge personnel immediately responded to the release by plugging the pipe and initiating remedial response activities. Some of the released crude oil was recovered with a vacuum truck. The remaining product was recovered by excavating the crude oil contaminated soil from the release footprint. Approximately 50 cubic yards of contaminated soil was stockpiled in the Superior Terminal Soil Management Area (SMA) contaminated soil building (Photos 1, 2, and 3) until off-site disposal was approved. Enbridge requested that Barr assist with the coordination of the off-site management of crude oil.

On December 12, 2014, Barr collected two analytical soil grab samples *Manifold 225-Stockpile-1* and *Manifold 225-Stockpile-2* from the contaminated stockpile based on the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) Guidance Document (GD) 4-04 Section II.B.1 and the Shamrock Landfill waste characterization sampling requirements. The stockpile was generally homogenous due to soil excavation and transportation methods. The samples were submitted to Legend Technical Services in St. Paul, Minnesota for laboratory analysis of diesel range organics (DRO), benzene, toluene, ethyl benzene and xylenes (BTEX), and Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) benzene. The laboratory report is provided in Attachment A.

The *Manifold 225-Stockpile-1* TCLP benzene concentration (0.67 mg/kg) exceeded the EPA hazardous waste criteria (0.50 mg/kg); however, the *Manifold 225-Stockpile-2* TCLP benzene concentration (0.12 mg/kg) did not exceed the EPA criteria. The average of the two samples was 0.395 mg/kg which is below the RCRA hazardous waste threshold. However, statistically, the averaged result did not meet the 90% upper confidence interval value, as required by the EPA and EPA SW-846 Chapter 9 which requires a 90 percent confidence interval. As a result, on January 8, 2015, Barr collected 2 additional TCLP benzene analytical samples, *Manifold 225-Stockpile-3* and *Manifold 225-Stockpile-4*, from the Manifold 225 stockpile and submitted them to Legend for analysis. The TCLP benzene concentrations for both soil samples were below method detection limits of 0.0048 mg/kg.

At a 90 percent confidence interval, it can be reported that the average of the soil samples was 0.4437 mg/kg which is below the RCRA hazardous waste threshold.

Attachment

Attachment 1 Waste Disposal Application and Laboratory Reports

Site Photos



Photo 1

Photo 2

Photo 1: Manifold 225 crude oil release contaminated soil stockpile in the Superior Terminal SMA building on December 12, 2014.

Photo 2: Manifold 225 crude oil release contaminated soil stockpile in the Superior Terminal SMA building on December 19, 2014.



Photo 3: Manifold 225 crude oil release contaminated soil stockpile in the Superior Terminal SMA building on December 19, 2014.